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 The recent global financial crisis contains 
cautionary lessons about the risks associated 
with principles-based regulation when it is not 
reinforced by an effective regulatory presence. 
Our response to the crisis, however, should not 
be a rush to enact more rules-based regulatory 
approaches. On the contrary, principles-based 
securities regulation offers more viable solu-
tions to the challenges that such a crisis pre-
sents for contemporary financial markets regu-
lation. 
 The author draws on the lesson of the 
global financial crisis to identify three critical 
factors for effective principles-based securities 
regulation. First, regulators must have the nec-
essary capacity in terms of numbers, access to 
information, and expertise in order to act as an 
effective counterweight to industry. Second, 
regulation needs to grapple with the impact of 
complexity on financial markets and their regu-
lation. Third, increased diversity among regula-
tors and greater independence from industry 
are required to avoid conflicts of interest, over-
reliance on market discipline, and “groupthink”. 
The paper calls for a continuing commitment to 
principles-based regulation, accompanied by 
meaningful enforcement and oversight. 
La récente crise financière mondiale nous 
invite à tirer une leçon de prudence quant aux 
risques associés à la réglementation fondée sur 
des principes lorsque cette réglementation n’est 
pas renforcée par une présence réglementaire 
efficace. Nous ne devrions toutefois pas nous 
empresser d’adopter davantage de réglementa-
tions fondées sur des règles. Au contraire, la ré-
glementation des valeurs mobilières basée sur 
des principes offre des solutions plus viables 
aux défis que pose une telle crise. 
 En se fondant sur les leçons tirées de la 
crise financière mondiale, l’auteure identifie 
trois facteurs critiques pour assurer l’efficacité 
d’une réglementation des valeurs mobilières 
fondée sur des principes. Premièrement, les or-
ganismes régulateurs doivent disposer des 
moyens nécessaires en termes d’effectifs, d’accès 
à l’information et d’expertise s’ils veulent 
contrebalancer l’industrie de façon efficace. 
Deuxièmement, la réglementation doit être aux 
prises avec l’impact de la complexité sur les 
marchés financiers et sur leur réglementation. 
Troisièmement, une plus grande diversité des 
organismes de réglementation et une plus 
grande indépendance face à l’industrie sont re-
quises pour éviter les conflits d’intérêts, la 
confiance excessive en la discipline du marché 
et la « pensée de groupe ». L’article appelle à un 
engagement continu envers la réglementation 
fondée sur des principes, accompagnée d’une 
application et d’une surveillance significatives. 
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Introduction 
 These remain early days to try to assess the impact of the global fi-
nancial crisis (GFC) and subsequent regulatory reform efforts on national 
and transnational financial markets regulation. That said, it is important 
to continue to assess events “on the fly” given how quickly reform efforts 
are evolving, how uncertain the future continues to be, and how pressing 
the need is to implement reforms in Canada and abroad.  
 This paper considers a particular aspect of regulatory design: princi-
ples-based regulation. It seeks to re-examine (and indeed to restate the 
case for) principles-based securities regulation, in light of the GFC and re-
lated developments. It argues against an overly hasty rush to more rules-
based formulations. Prior to the onset of the crisis, the concept of more 
principles-based financial regulation was gaining traction in regulatory 
practice and policy circles.1 In Canada, steps were being taken to develop 
more principles-based securities regulation under the leadership of a pro-
posed new national securities regulator. The federal government’s Expert 
Panel on Securities Regulation (Expert Panel), chaired by the Honourable 
Tom Hockin, was struck in February 2008 with a mandate to provide in-
dependent recommendations on how to improve the structure, content, 
and enforcement of securities regulation in Canada. It released its final 
report on 12 January 2009, recommending inter alia that Canada adopt a 
more principles-based approach.2 On 22 June 2009, Doug Hyndman, long-
time Chair of the British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC), was 
appointed to a two-year term as chair of Canada’s transition office for a 
new national securities regulator.3 Hyndman, along with Vice Chair 
                                                  
1   See U.K., Financial Services Authority, Principles-Based Regulation: Focusing on the 
Outcomes That Matter (London: Financial Services Authority, 2007), online: Financial 
Services Authority <http://www.fsa.gov.uk> [Focusing on the Outcomes]; History of the 
2004 B.C. Securities Legislation, online: British Columbia Securities Commission 
<http://www.bcsc.bc.ca> [2004 B.C. Securities]; Cristie L. Ford, “New Governance, Com-
pliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation” (2008) 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 1 at 12, n. 
45 [Ford, “New Governance”]; Julia Black et al., “Making a Success of Principles-Based 
Regulation” (2007) 1(3) L. & Financial Markets Rev. 191 [Black, “Making a Success”]. 
Cf. Lawrence A. Cunningham, “A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of ‘Principles-
Based Systems’ in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting” (2007) 60 
Vand. L. Rev. 1411 [Cunningham, “Retire the Rhetoric”]. 
2   Canada, Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Creating an Advantage in Capital 
Markets: Final Report and Recommendations (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2009) at 
17, online: Expert Panel on Securities Regulation <http://www.expertpanel.ca> [Capital 
Markets].  
3   Department of Finance Canada, News Release, 2009-064 “Minister of Finance An-
nounces Launch of Canadian Securities Regulator Transition Office” (22 June 2009), 
online: Department of Finance Canada <http://www.fin.gc.ca >. The federal government 
is also seeking a reference opinion from the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitu-
tionality of a national securities regulator. See Steven Chase & Rhéal Séguin, “Ottawa 
sets off constitutional battle over regulator” The Globe and Mail (17 October 2009) A1.  
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Brent Aitken, has been the driving force behind the BCSC’s principles-
based approach and could be expected to bring that commitment to his 
new role. 
 In the interim between the Expert Panel’s creation and its final re-
port, of course, global credit markets froze, stock market values went into 
free fall, Wall Street investment banks collapsed, major financial institu-
tions were bailed out on an unprecedented scale, and financial regulatory 
systems internationally were cast into doubt.4 A flurry of ambitious re-
form proposals followed. Among others, in March 2009 Lord Adair Turner 
released the Turner Review in the United Kingdom, subtitled A Regula-
tory Response to the Global Banking Crisis,5 and major financial markets 
regulatory reform has been proposed in both the United Kingdom and the 
United States.6 Several major domestic and international policy bodies7 
and a number of scholars8 have contributed to the conversation. Along 
with such reform proposals came a turn, in some quarters, against princi-
ples-based regulation.9 
                                                  
4   For a timeline of the crisis, see R.M. Schneiderman, “A Year of Financial Turmoil” The 
New York Times (11 September 2009), online: The New York Times 
<http://www.nytimes.com>. 
5   U.K., Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the 
Global Banking Crisis (London: Financial Services Authority, 2009), online: Financial 
Services Authority <http://www.fsa.gov.uk>. 
6   See e.g. Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation: 
Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation (2009), online: Financial Stability for 
the American Economy <http://www.financialstability.gov > [Department of the Treas-
ury, Financial Regulatory Reform]; U.K., Her Majesty’s Treasury, Reforming Financial 
Markets (London: The Stationery Office, 2009), online: Her Majesty’s Treasury 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/reforming_financial_markets080709.pdf>. 
7   See e.g. Switzerland, Bank for International Settlements, 79th Annual Report: 1 April 
2008–31 March 2009 (29 June 2009), online: Bank for International Settlements 
<http://www.bis.org>; Ana Carvajal et al., The Perimeter of Financial Regulation (26 
March 2009), online: International Monetary Fund <https://www.imf.org >. 
8   See e.g. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, “Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury 
Have a Better Idea?” (2009) 95 Va. L. Rev. 707; Luigi Zingales, “A New Regulatory 
Framework: Three Agencies, Based on the Three Main Goals of Financial Regulation”, 
online: (2009) 19:2 City Journal  <http://www.city-journal.org>. Others have sounded 
more cautionary notes about the rush to reform. See generally Luca Enriques, “Regula-
tors’ Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming Reregulation of Financial Mar-
kets: One Reluctant Regulator’s View” (2009) 30 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 1147 (arguing that re-
forms are driven by public relations concerns); Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman, 
“Risks, Rules, and Institutions: A Process for Reforming Financial Regulation,” (2009) 
39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 881 (raising concerns that reforms initiated during a period of crisis 
management may not be optimal, and suggesting a careful three-step approach to regu-
latory reform). 
9   See e.g. Felix Salmon, “The US move to principles-based regulation” Reuters (17 June 
2009), online: Reuters <http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/17/the-us-move-to-
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 This paper argues that the GFC does not discredit principles-based 
regulation, as that form of regulation is properly understood. On the con-
trary, principles-based securities regulation remains a viable and even 
necessary policy option: it offers solutions to the practical and theoretical 
challenges that the GFC presents to contemporary financial markets 
regulation. What the crisis actually demonstrates is how damaging a lais-
sez-faire mindset on the part of regulators can be to any form of regula-
tion, including principles-based regulation. Adopting principles-based 
regulation does not mean doing away with rules. Rather, it is a particular 
approach to structuring regulation that includes rules. It gives legisla-
tures the power to set high-level regulatory goals and outcomes, and 
leaves the articulation of processes and details to front-line regulators in 
collaboration with industry itself. Fundamental to principles-based regu-
lation is the development of a functional and effective “interpretive com-
munity” that includes industry participants, regulators, and other stake-
holders in ongoing communication around the content of regulatory prin-
ciples. 
 The experience of the GFC is a lesson about what happens when regu-
lators fail to participate actively and skeptically in that interpretive com-
munity. Principles-based regulation is premised on concepts of “co-
regulation”, or “enforced self-regulation”, but the GFC illustrates how 
such models can slide into bare self-regulation in the absence of meaning-
ful regulatory oversight and engagement. Our response should not be to 
re-embrace more rules-based regulatory approaches. Financial markets 
are too fast-moving and complex to be regulated in a command-and-
control manner, and the risk of Enron-style “loophole behaviour” associ-
ated with rules is too great.10 Instead, we can draw on the lesson of the 
GFC to identify three critical success factors for effective principles-based 
securities regulation.  
 First, regulators need to have the necessary capacity in terms of num-
bers, access to information, expertise, and perspective to act as an effec-
tive counterweight to industry as the content of principles is developed. 
Second, regulation needs to grapple with the impact of complexity on fi-
nancial markets and their regulation. Effective regulation should reflect 
an appropriately granulated understanding of  kinds of complexity and 
their effects, and reject the notion that innovation is by definition benefi-
cial. It may also mean considering whether some regulatory requirements 
(e.g., capital requirements) are best cast as bright-line “prophylactic 
rules”, which at least in the short term may limit complexity and conserve 
regulatory resources. Finally, this paper suggests that the lack of diver-
      
principles-based-regulation/> (the author notes that in his newsroom, he is in “a minor-
ity of one” for continuing to advocate for principles-based regulation). 
10    
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sity and independence among regulators and industry may have contrib-
uted to conflicts of interest, overreliance on market discipline, and “group-
think” in the run-up to the GFC. The appropriate response may be a move 
away from an expertise-based, technocratic model toward a more broadly 
participatory one. The paper closes with a call for a continuing commit-
ment to principles-based regulation, accompanied by the indispensable 
implementation piece—meaningful enforcement and oversight. 
I. Principles and Rules in Theory and Practice 
 Principles-based capital markets regulation has been a salient policy 
topic in recent years in many jurisdictions including Canada, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom.11 In terms of actual practice, the U.K. 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) has been a thought leader on princi-
ples-based financial regulation.12 In Canada, the province of British Co-
lumbia tried to promulgate a new, more principles-based Securities Act in 
2004.  Although that proposed act has not been brought into force, the 
BCSC has since adopted a more principles-based approach to how it ad-
ministers its existing act..13 Derivative products in the United States and 
Canada also tend to be regulated in a more principles-based manner.14 
                                                  
11   See e.g. Purdy Crawford et al., eds., Crawford Panel on a Single Canadian Securities 
Regulator: Blueprint for a Canadian Securities Commission (7 June 2006), online: 
Crawford Panel <http://www.crawfordpanel.ca> (“to provide Canadian capital markets 
with a competitive advantage globally, it is desirable to have as much principles-based 
regulation as is feasible” at 12); Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Can-
ada: Canada Steps Up, vol. 1, online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in 
Canada ‹http://www.tfmsl.ca› (recommending that securities regulation be based “at 
every available opportunity” on “clearly enunciated regulatory principles which do not 
need a detailed set of interventionist rules for sound implementation” at 50); U.S., De-
partment of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure 
(Washington: Department of the Treasury, 2008) at 106-16 (recommending a merged 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)- Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) entity that adopts the CFTC’s principles-based approach);  U.S., Committee 
on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: 2006), online: Committee on Capital Markets Regula-
tion <http://www.capmktsreg.org> (arguing that the SEC and self-regulatory organiza-
tions should move to a more “risk-based and principles-based” process (at 8)).  
12   Focusing on the Outcomes, supra note 1; Black, “Making a Success”, supra note 1; Cris-
tie Ford, “Principles-Based Securities Regulation” (2009), online: Expert Panel on Secu-
rities Regulation <http://www.expertpanel.ca> [Ford, “Securities Regulation”] (describ-
ing the main components of the FSA regulatory approach as: a hybrid rules and princi-
ples structure; extensive consultation with industry actors; a management-based, out-
come-oriented, and risk-based regulatory approach; and an emphasis on compliance 
and supervision as opposed to ex post enforcement). 
13   See Submission of the British Columbia Securities Commission, online: British Colum-
bia Securities Commission <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca > [Submission BCSC].  
14   See e.g. Walter Lukken, “It’s a Matter of Principles” (Lecture delivered at the Univer-
sity of Houston’s Global Energy Management Institute, 25 January 2007), online: 
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Most recently in Canada, as noted above, the Expert Panel chaired by the 
Honourable Tom Hockin has recommended that a proposed national secu-
rities regulator adopt a more principles-based approach to securities regu-
lation.15 
 At the theoretical level, the distinction between rules and principles, 
and their relative advantages and disadvantages, have been quite well 
canvassed.16 Generally speaking, rules are considered to have the advan-
tages of being more precise and certain, but the consequent disadvantages 
of being potentially rigid, reactive, and insensitive to context and there-
fore inevitable over- or under-inclusive.  They may also promote or permit 
“loophole” behaviour, and be more easily “gamed” by sophisticated actors.  
In comparison, principles are more flexible, more sensitive to context, and 
therefore potentially fairer when applied.  On the other hand, principles 
can be uncertain, unpredictable, and difficult and costly to interpret.  Be-
cause they allocate substantial decision making to front-line decision 
makers, they can also permit arbitrary conduct and regulatory over-
reaching. 
 A simple example that has been used to illustrate the difference be-
tween rules and principles involves speed limits.17 A speed limit framed as 
a rule will prohibit driving faster than a precise numerical limit, for ex-
ample, 90 kilometres per hour.  The rule sets out, in advance and with 
precision, the boundary of acceptable conduct.  This leaves very little dis-
cretion to the front line decision maker, who only needs to determine 
      
Commodity Futures Trading Commission <http://www.cftc.gov >; Bill 77, Derivatives 
Act, 1st Sess., 38th Leg., Quebec, 2008 (assented to 20 June 2008), S.Q. 2008, c. 24 
[QDA]. 
15   Capital Markets, supra note 2 at 22. The Expert Panel also developed draft legislation 
for its national securities regulator. See “Draft Securities Act”, online: Expert Panel on 
Securities Regulation <http://www.expertpanel.ca> [“Draft Securities Act”]. 
16   See especially Carol M. Rose, “Crystals and Mud in Property Law” (1988) 40 Stan. L. 
Rev. 577; Kathleen M. Sullivan, “ The Justices of Rules and Standards”, Foreward, The 
Supreme Court, 1991 Term, (1992) 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22; Pierre Schlag, “Rules and 
Standards” (1985) 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379; Frederick Schauer, “The Tyranny of Choice 
and the Rulification of Standards” (2005) 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 803; Antonin 
Scalia, “The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules” (1989) 56 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1175; Louis 
Kaplow, “Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis” (1992) 42 Duke L.J. 557; 
Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 89 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1685; Cass R. Sunstein, “Problems with Rules” (1995) 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953. 
Scholars working specifically in securities regulation, accounting, and tax have looked 
at how rules or principles affect industry behaviour, and how to choose between rules 
and principles in particular situations. See e.g. William W. Bratton, “Enron, Sarbanes-
Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents” (2003) 48 Vill. L. Rev. 
1023; James J. Park, “The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation” (2007) 57 
Duke L. J. 625; Mark W. Nelson, “Behavioural Evidence on the Effects of Principles- 
and Rules-Based Standards” (2003) 17 Accouting Horizons 91. 
17   See Kaplow, supra note 16 at 559-60; Sullivan, supra note 16 at 58-59. 
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whether the car in question was exceeding that predetermined and non-
negotiable limit.  By contrast, a speed limit framed in principles based 
terms would be something like a prohibition on driving faster than is 
“reasonable and prudent in all the circumstances.” This was, in fact, how 
the state of Montana framed its speed limits for several years.  The non-
numerical “reasonableness” standard has the ability to take context – 
such as road and environmental conditions, time of day, driver’s experi-
ence, etc. – into account.  As a consequence, it also allocates substantial 
decision making power to the front line decision maker, who must use her 
judgment to determine what “reasonable and prudent” driving constitutes 
in all the circumstances. 18 It should be emphasized that speed limits in-
volve very different background conditions than securities regulation does 
in terms of (among other things) the complexity of the subject matter, the 
scope for and fluidity of potential wrongdoing, and the expertise of the 
front line decision maker.19 The two are not really analogous.  That said, 
it is noteworthy that Montana repealed its principles based speed limit in 
1999, after the Montana Supreme Court held it to be so vague as to vio-
late the Due Process clause of the state constitution. 
 The terms are also useful at the systemic level, for describing practical 
regulatory approaches.20 No workable system consists entirely of rules or 
of principles, but different systems can be comparatively more rules- or 
principles-based—a point the FSA has made by calling its world-leading 
                                                  
18   In the years prior to 1974, and from 1995 to 1999, Montana used a non-numerical, “rea-
sonable and prudent” speed limit. The limit was subsequently repealed when it was 
found to be so vague as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Montana Constitution. 
See State of Montana v. Rudy Stanko, 1998 MT 321, 292 Mont. 214 (Mont. Sup. Ct.). On 
the potential vagueness of principles in the securities law enforcement context, see 
Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12 at 31-34. 
19   This paper contests the idea that rules are more certain than a principles-based system 
that is supported by a well-functioning interpretive community and adequate regula-
tory capacity. See “Complexity and Prophylactic Rules” below. However, it does not con-
test the idea that rules are more certain and principles more flexible in the abstract 
(i.e., in the absence of a mechanism such as a careful, structured, ongoing multiparty 
dialogue for working out the content of principles in a responsible manner). Of course, 
even under ideal conditions, application will influence theory in direct and indirect 
ways.  For example, through application to real-life situations, principles acquire spe-
cific content on a constant, ongoing basis. Decision makers may interpret a rule “up” or 
“down” (making it look more like a principle or more like a detailed rule) to make it fit a 
specific situation. Principles, as well, when interpreted by multiple human beings in 
multiple situations, may lose their high-level character, slide closer to rules, get fuzzy 
around the edges, and otherwise drift and change (see e.g. Schauer, supra note 16). 
Therefore, whether a regulatory system fosters clarity and predictability, for example, 
is not entirely related to whether it is rules-based or principles-based. The real question 
is whether regulators and regulatees have a shared understanding of what the regula-
tions entail. 
20   Cf. Cunningham, “Retire the Rhetoric”, supra note 1; Ford, “New Governance”, supra 
note 1 at 12, n. 45. 
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approach simply “more principles-based”.21 Statutory drafters and regula-
tors can choose to regulate the same issues by way of different proportions 
of detailed checklists, bright-line rules, or open-ended goal statements.22 
In the context of statutory drafting, principles-based regulation means 
legislation that contains more directives that are cast at a higher level of 
generality. A principles-based system looks to principles first and uses 
them, instead of detailed rules, wherever feasible. When confronted with 
a new situation, a principles-based system first determines whether it can 
be regulated under existing principles, and it resists the temptation to 
create new, purpose-built rules.23 Yet even within a system that is gener-
ally principles-based, rules will always serve an essential purpose in en-
hancing clarity at key junctures, and buttressing ex post enforceability.”. 
 Rules and principles are also best understood as points on a contin-
uum rather than discrete concepts, and there is a good deal of overlap and 
convergence among them.24 Any complex regulatory system will be (and 
should be) an amalgam of rules and principles. Here, the the public per-
ception of “principles-based regulation” exhibits considerable confusion. 
For example, 87.5 per cent of the seventy-five written submissions from 
stakeholders to the Expert Panel were in favour of principles-based regu-
lation.25 But of these submissions, a substantial number seemed to as-
                                                  
21   Focusing on the Outcomes, supra note 1 at 4-5. 
22   See Black, “Making a Success”, supra note 1 (identifying the distinction between bright-
line rules and detailed rules). 
23   See e.g. BCSC on responses to the GFC:  
 To the extent that market professionals misrepresented the features or 
risks of investment products, or sold unsuitable investments to unsophisti-
cated investors, we already have rules against that type of conduct. Rather 
than devising new rules for what is already illegal, we need to maintain and 
adapt our compliance and enforcement processes to detect and deter this ac-
tivity.  
 This is not to say that we should not consider rule changes …  
 Any new rule, however, should be based on thorough analysis that shows 
it to be the best option for achieving a desired regulatory outcome. All too of-
ten, policymakers start with the presumption that a situation demands new 
rules, and they lose focus on other options like enforcing existing require-
ments that could deal with the problem more quickly and effectively (08/09 
Annual Report, online: British Columbia Securities Commission 
<http://www.bcsc.bc.ca> at 3).  
24   See e.g. Russell B. Korobkin, “Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Stan-
dards Revisited” (2000) 79 Or. L. Rev. 23; Neil MacCormick, “Reconstruction after De-
construction: A Response to CLS” (1990) 10 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 539 at 545; Frederick 
Schauer, “The Convergence of Rules and Standards” (2003) N.Z.L. Rev. 303 at 305; Ian 
Ayres, “Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules” (1993) 3 S. 
Cal. Interdisciplinary L.J. 1 at 18. 
25   See Written Submissions (2008), online: Expert Panel on Securities Regulation 
<http://www.expertpanel.ca >. 
10    (2010) 55  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
sume that principles-based and rules-based regulation were at opposite 
extremes, and that a move to a more principles-based system meant sub-
stantially eliminating rules, no matter how efficient or necessary they 
might be. Several stakeholders argued forcefully against exclusively prin-
ciples-based or rules-based approaches, even though no such drastic move 
was being proposed.  
A. A Time for Principles, A Time for Rules 
 Almost three decades ago, Colin Diver discussed what he called the 
“optimal precision” of administrative rules—meaning, the degree of speci-
ficity in statutory or regulatory drafting that would best avoid the worst 
problems of either imprecision or rigidity.26  He identified three elements 
of regulatory precision: transparency (i.e., the words chosen have well-
defined and universally-accepted meanings within the relevant commu-
nity), accessibility (i.e., the law can be applied to concrete situations with-
out excessive difficulty), and congruence (i.e., the substantive content 
communicated by the words produces the desired behaviour).  Not sur-
prisingly, Diver found that no single “sweet spot” of precision exists.  On 
some questions, flexibility and sensitivity to a particular context will be 
more important than certainty or the need to limit discretion.  More gen-
eral, principles-based drafting would make sense in that context.  Else-
where, a different mix would be called for.  Diver also pointed out that 
these qualities are difficult to measure, and there are often direct trade-
offs between them.  Therefore, settling upon a particular mix between 
rules and principles requires that choices be made, and public priorities 
be established. 
 In particular, where these lines are drawn depends on public priorities 
that the legislator has the mandate to establish. For example, a legislator 
that is concerned about regulatory overreach or lack of transparency in a 
particular area would see to it that the regulator had very little discretion 
(i.e., that expectations are cast as rules rather than principles and are en-
shrined in a statute) when it comes to such things as access to informa-
tion, the handling of complaints, or accountability to Parliament. A legis-
lator concerned about individual rights would limit discretion (i.e., would 
craft rules not principles) regarding hearings, procedural fairness, and 
participation or consultation rights. A legislator concerned about ensuring 
that the regulator can keep up with fast-moving events would give that 
regulator principles, not rules, to work with, and would devolve substan-
                                                  
26   Colin Diver, “The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules” (1983) 93 Yale L.J. 65 
[Diver].  Diver does not use the terms rules and principles, but his understanding of 
precision maps neatly onto the theoretical rules-versus-principles scholarship discussed 
in the previous section. 
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tial decision making to the regulator’s rule-making power. A legislator 
concerned about ensuring a high correlation between regulatory goals and 
effective application to particular cases would ensure that the regulator 
had the power to flesh out the content of principles on a rolling basis, 
rather than trying to draft specific details in advance. 
 Important external considerations also come into play. For example, 
how much scope does the legislator want to leave to the interpretation of 
regulators, as well as potentially of courts or tribunals? Where does exist-
ing regulatory practice (whether principles-based or rules-based) seem to 
be well-established, to be working well, and to have created expectations 
on which stakeholders rely?27 Would a particular drafting approach foster 
harmonization between existing regulatory regimes, or nudge regulatory 
practice in a desirable new direction? Are some issues particularly impor-
tant to the proper functioning of Canadian capital markets (i.e., regulat-
ing effectively the many small, closely held public companies, or address-
ing the rumoured Canadian “market discount”28), which call for well-
tailored and highly adaptive—that is, principles-based—solutions? On 
what specific issues does the political will exist to move decisively away 
from the status quo? What messages does Canada, through its regulatory 
regime, want to send internationally? All of this requires that policy-
makers develop a set of criteria reflecting policy calculations for deciding 
when to use rules and when to use principles.  
 Context also matters. An appropriate balance between rules and prin-
ciples in securities regulation may look quite different from the appropri-
ate balance in other regulatory arenas. The nature of the industry being 
regulated, the roles of the various players in it, and the risks associated 
                                                  
27   See e.g. Lawrence A. Cunningham, “Principles and Rules in Public and Professional Se-
curities Law Enforcement: A Comparative U.S. – Canadian Inquiry” in Task Force to 
Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada: Canada Steps Up, vol. 6, online: Task 
Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada ‹http://www.tfmsl.ca› 253 at 299 
(finding that in their enforcement actions, the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers and the IDA, now Financial Industry Regulatory Assocation (FINRA) and Invest-
ment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC), invoke certain principles 
rather than existing rules).  
28   For a discussion of the Canadian “market discount,” see e.g. The Hon. Peter de C. Cory, 
C.C & Marilyn L. Pilkington, “Critical Issues in Enforcement” in Task Force to Modern-
ize Securities Legislation in Canada: Canada Steps Up, vol. 6, online: Task Force to 
Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada ‹http://www.tfmsl.ca› 165; Utpal Bhatta-
charya, “Enforcement and its Impact on Cost of Equity and Liquidity of the Market” in 
Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada: Canada Steps Up, vol. 6, 
online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada ‹http://www.tfmsl.ca› 
131; Crawford, supra note 11 at 12. For a review of some recent research challenging 
the existence of the Canadian discount, see Cécile Carpentier, Jean-François L’Her & 
Jean-Marc Suret, “On the Competitiveness of the Canadian Stock Market” (2009) 24 
B.F.L.R. 287 at 300-303. 
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with that area of conduct will inform the regulatory design process.29 It is 
relevant that securities regulation is a disclosure-based system that relies 
heavily on ensuring reasonable access to information as a means for pro-
tecting investors. This suggests that congruence is important in this con-
text, so that core definitions of materiality and disclosure should be broad 
and principles-based. Other areas where the over- or under-inclusiveness 
of rules is particularly problematic, and where flexibility and congruence 
are especially important, is preventing fraud and minimizing “cosmetic” 
compliance and “loophole behaviour”. This is the rationale for broad statu-
tory definitions of fraud, and commissions’ sweeping public interest pow-
ers.30 Financial markets are also complex, fast-moving environments 
marked by constant product-level innovation. Principles recommend 
themselves in this environment, when underpinned by effective informa-
tion-gathering and analytical mechanisms,31 since detailed rules may only 
add to complexity and opacity.32 Principles also make sense where a flexi-
ble approach is needed to ensure good corporate conduct—for example, 
with regard to internal compliance processes, corporate culture, or risk 
assessment by management.33  Like the deference accorded to securities 
commissions under administrative law,34 principles-based regulation also 
                                                  
29   See also Black, “Making a Success”, supra note 1 at 200-201. 
30   See Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario 
(Securities Commission), 2001 SCC 37, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132 at para. 41, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 
577 [Asbestos Minority Shareholders]; Anita Anand, “Carving the Public Interest Juris-
diction in Securities Regulation: Contributions of Justice Iacobucci” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 
293. Even considering the substantial deference to securities commissions, courts (and 
commissions themselves through their policies) should establish standards and explicit 
rationales for the application of public interest powers to ensure that they are exercised 
in a predictable way, as well as to ensure that those applying them consider relevant 
factors, do not consider inappropriate factors, and behave fairly.  
31   See discussion in “Four Points on Regulatory Capacity” below. 
32   See Steven L. Schwarcz, “Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets” (2009) 87 
Wash. L. Rev. [Schwarcz, “Regulating Complexity”], citing Richard Bookstaber at note 
118. 
33   Edward Rubin, “The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse” 
(2005) 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073 (arguing for open-ended formulations where the regula-
tor “knows the result it is trying to achieve but does not know the means for achieving 
it, when circumstances are likely to change in ways that the [regulator] cannot predict, 
or when the [regulator] does not even know the precise result that she desires” at 2131); 
see also Ford, “New Governance”, supra note 1. Colin Diver has suggested that the reg-
istration of persons should fall at the more principles-based end of the spectrum, be-
cause registration and licensure do not deter or influence conduct and try to make pre-
dictions about future conduct about which little can be known at the time of licensing 
(supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 79). 
34   See Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557 at 596, 
114 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 7 W.W.R. 1 [Pezim cited to S.C.R.]; Asbestos Minority Sharehold-
ers, supra note 30 at para. 49. 
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reflects legislative faith in regulatory expertise, objectivity, fairness, and 
capacity. 
 One can also identify situations where rules may make particular 
sense in securities regulation. Consistency in form is important in disclo-
sure documents, for example, to make it easier for potential investors to 
compare investments.35 Prospectus requirements should therefore contain 
detailed form requirements. Securities commissions are also powerful 
administrative agencies, with broad mandates and the ability to impose 
heavy sanctions. For rule of law reasons, process requirements associated 
with investigatory powers and enforcement conduct should be clearly set 
out. Provisions around notice, rights to hearings, time limits, and proce-
dural fairness should presumptively be more rules-based. Rules also make 
sense where the sheer cost of applying a principle outweighs the princi-
ple’s flexibility benefits—for example, where the regulator needs to man-
age large numbers of relatively small matters.36 Accessibility is also im-
portant if lay individuals will be interpreting the law on their own. This is 
a concern in capital markets like Canada, within which many small actors 
with limited compliance resources operate.37 During a transitional stage 
between rules-based and principles-based regulation, for example, main-
taining legacy rules may help keep compliance costs down. Finally, rules 
may be appropriate in situations where the regulator or statutory drafter 
is confident that it can devise an easy to describe, easy to verify, and fairly 
stable rule-based requirement that will serve as an effective proxy for a 
broader regulatory goal, such as ensuring good corporate conduct.38 
                                                  
35   As technology improves, for example through the mandated use of Extensible Business 
Reporting Language (XBRL), consistency in form may be seen as less important than 
ensuring the most effective possible disclosure. See “An Introduction to XBRL”, online: 
XBRL International <http://www.xbrl.org>. 
36   Kaplow, supra note 16. Kaplow also argues that the determining factor should be the 
frequency of regulated action. Where frequency is low, standards are preferable; where 
frequency is high, the costs of promulgating rules are justifiable (ibid. at 621). Trading 
rules are a good example of a rules-based treatment of high-frequency events. 
37   See generally Christopher Nicholls, “The Characteristics of Canada’s Capital Markets 
and the Illustrative Case of Canada’s Legislative Regulatory Response to Sarbanes-
Oxley” in Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada: Canada Steps Up, 
vol. 4, online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada 
<http://www.tfmsl.ca> 127. After the transitional stage, principles may prove much eas-
ier to implement than rules for smaller actors. Nicholls suggests that the small size of 
Canadian small-cap and micro-cap companies implies a more flexible regime, rather 
than a more rules-bound one (ibid. at 162). 
38   Clayton P. Gillette, “Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems” (1996) 82 
Va. L. Rev. 181 (“Precise directives are more appropriate when we have the greatest 
confidence in our capacity to inform target actors (those at whom legal directives are 
aimed), to describe antisocial forms of behavior (so that target actors know the scope of 
permitted and prohibited activity), and to recognize the occurrence of such behavior (for 
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B. Actual Principles-Based Securities Regulation: Key Characteristics 
 In producing a research report on principles-based regulation for the 
Expert Panel,39 I reviewed and compared (1) the Ontario Securities Act;40 
(2) Bill 38, the proposed British Columbia Securities Act, and associated 
proposed securities rules (collectively, the “B.C. Model”);41 (3) the Quebec 
Derivatives Act;42 (4) the United Kingdom Financial Services and Markets 
Act;43 and (5) the United States Commodity Futures Modernization Act44 
with a view to determining how principles-based regulation differed from 
more rules-based regulation at the level of statutory drafting.45 The OSA 
was chosen to represent the legislative status quo across Canada. The 
Quebec statute and the B.C. Model are generally understood to be more 
principles-based. The FSMA was not explicitly principles-based when it 
was drafted, but the FSA adapted its statutory mandate to develop a 
world-leading model of principles-based regulation.46  
 Without claiming to be comprehensive, the report identified some 
overarching themes at the level of statutory drafting.47 There were several 
commonalities across regulatory schemes, regardless of whether the re-
      
purposes of enforcement). Uncertainty about any of these factors warrants the use of 
less precise formulations” at 185). 
39   See Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12. 
40   Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 [OSA]. 
41   Bill 38, Securities Act, 5th Sess., 37th Leg., British Columbia, 2004 (assented to 13 May 
2004), S.B.C. 2004, c. 43, s. 203 [Bill 38]; “Securities Rules (proposed)” (21 June 2004) at 
Rules 93-104, 114-16, online: British Columbia Securities Commission 
<http://www.bcsc.bc.ca > [“Securities Rules”].  
42   QDA, supra note 14. 
43   Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (U.K.), 2000, c. 8 [FSMA]. 
44   Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. §1 (2000) [CFMA]. 
45   The report also occasionally considered the in-force B.C. Securities Act. 
46   See Julia Black, “Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation” (2008), online: 
<http://www.scribd.com> at 12 [Black, “Forms and Paradoxes”] (distinguishing among 
the following: “formal PBR”, meaning principles in the rule books; “substantive PBR”, 
which has some of the operational elements of PBR but not principles on the rule books; 
“full PBR”, exhibiting both principles in the rule books and a principles-based opera-
tional approach; and “polycentric PBR”, which is full PBR with the additional element 
of incorporationg third parties into the regulatory process). 
47   Note that the report compared statutes only. A comprehensive comparison of these 
regulatory regimes is neither feasible nor very helpful, given the number of different 
factors that go into the drafting of any statute. Just as importantly, national and multi-
lateral instruments, regulations, and rules play central roles in real-life securities regu-
lation. On this larger plane, this report concurs generally with Professor Stéphane 
Rousseau’s description of which aspects of securities regulation are rule-based and 
which are principles-based, as referred to in the Brief submitted by the Autorité des 
marchés financiers to the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation. See Autorité des 
marchés financiers, Single Regulator: A Needless Proposal , online: Autoritiés des 
marchés financiers <http://www.lautorite.qc.ca > at 26-27.  
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gime was more rules- or principles-based, and the draft securities act is-
sued by the Expert Panel (based as it was on the existing Alberta Securi-
ties Act)48 reflects the same choices. For example, disclosure and fraud 
provisions tend to be drafted in a more principles-based manner because 
these are areas where congruence is essential (i.e., the definition of fraud 
must be able to capture even novel forms of fraudulent behaviour) and 
loophole behaviour cannot be tolerated. Compliance provisions—which 
require registrants to maintain effective systems and controls to manage 
the risks associated with their businesses, and prevent and detect inter-
nal wrongdoing—also tend to be principles-based.49 More detailed rules 
cover topic areas where power is uneven and transparency is not other-
wise ensured, or where fairness and basic administrative law underpin-
nings are at stake. For example, every securities scheme has provisions 
that govern administrative proceedings such as hearings and investiga-
tions, and they are all substantially process based and rule oriented.50 The 
statutes are less detailed around areas that change quickly or that re-
quire specialized expertise. In general, these overarching commonalities 
accord with the Diver analysis as to where transparency, flexibility, or 
congruence should be the dominant concerns.  
 The Expert Panel research report also identified particular ways in 
which more principles-based and rules-based regimes differ. Some differ-
ences are essentially stylistic. For example, principles-based regulation is 
consistent with a move toward plain language drafting.51 Other differ-
ences, while consistent with a principles-based regulatory philosophy, are 
not essential to it. In particular, the proposed B.C. legislation originally 
imagined much more streamlined processes in its proposals for firm-only 
registration and continuous market access.52 Another element common to 
                                                  
48   See “Draft Securities Act”, supra note 15 at 3; Securities Act, R.S.A. 2000, C. S-4.  
49   But see QDA, supra note 14, cls. 26-31, 61-62.  See also the compliance provisions in 
Registration Requirements and Exemptions, B.C.S.C. NI 31-103 (advanced notice, effec-
tive 28 September  2009) at Part 11 [NI31-103], online: British Columbia Securities 
Commission <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/>.  
50  The best examples here are OSA, supra note 40, ss. 3.5, 8-9; and Bill 38, supra note 40, 
cls. 65, 70(2)-(3), 75. The FSMA and QDA do not contain direct analogues. Because the 
FSMA establishes an independent oversight body, the Financial Services and Markets 
Tribunal, it treats administrative proceedings somewhat differently. However, the 
process-based and rule-driven structure persists. See e.g. FSMA, supra note 43, s. 13. 
The QDA is a more circumscribed statute that borrows many provisions from the Que-
bec Securities Act, though it contains some process-based provisions at ss. 115-17.  
51  
52   See Bill 38, supra note 41. Section [...] would have replaced existing prospectus disclo-
sure rules, short form prospectus provisions, the entire exempt market transaction 
structure, and existing continuous disclosure obligations, as they then were, with an 
overarching “Continuous Market Access” structure. Continuous Market Access would 
have required all companies accessing the British Columbia capital markets simply to 
disclose all “material information” (here, replacing “material fact” and “material 
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the principles-based statutes considered is the inclusion of a small num-
ber of high-level principles guiding the conduct of regulated entities.53 
Consistent with the principles-based approach, how exactly those princi-
ples translate into specific business-conduct expectations in context is left 
to be filled in through techniques such as administrative guidance, en-
forcement example, the incorporation and dissemination of good or best 
practices, and ongoing communication between regulator and registrant.54  
 The most profound structural differences between the more principles-
based and more rules-based statutes are found in two areas: (1) the pro-
portion of decision making and interpretive power that is explicitly left to 
be filled in through the rule-making function, rather than statutory draft-
ing; and (2) the proportion of outcome-oriented versus process-oriented 
statutory requirements. 
 All four statutes studied grant rule-making power to the regulator in 
question.55 To be clear, securities law statutes in every jurisdiction contain 
notable principles-based provisions.56 By contrast to regulators in other 
fields, securities regulators already have extensive notice-and-comment 
rule-making powers and enjoy substantial deference from courts on judi-
cial review.57 As between the more rules-based and principles-based sys-
tems, however, the difference lies in how much detail is provided in the 
statute, and how much is left to be filled in through the Authority’s or 
Commission’s rule making. The difference between a traditional, more 
rules-based approach to statutory drafting and the B.C. version of more 
principles-based drafting is strikingly illustrated in the Table of Concor-
      
change”) on a real-time basis. Other B.C. model innovations included firm-only registra-
tion (which was abandoned before the project as a whole was abandoned), secondary 
market liability (which was later resurrected), and enhanced enforcement powers.    
53   The FSA refers to its set of principles as the “Principles for Business” (Principles for 
Business, online: Financial Services Authority ‹http://www.fsa.gov.uk ›); British Colum-
bia’s Bill 38 would have contained a “Code of Conduct for Dealers and Advisors”; and, 
the CFMA (supra note 44) and QDA (QDA, supra note 14 ) both refer to theirs as “Core 
Principles for Derivative Markets.” Many of the principles contained in B.C.’s Code of 
Conduct have since found their way into NI 31-103 (supra note 49), though that in-
strument also contains detailed rules.  
54   For a more detailed description of these techniques and their use in ascribing content to 
regulatory principles, see Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12 at 9-13. 
55   See OSA, supra note 40, s. 143; Bill 38, supra note 41, s. 170; QDA, supra note 14, ss. 
174-75; FSMA, supra note 43, s. 138. Rule making needs to be distinguished not only 
from statutes, but also from regulations, which, though subordinate, must go through 
the legislative process rather than being largely or entirely under the control of the 
regulator itself. 
56   See e.g. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C §78j (2000), and Rule 10b-5-1, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009) promulgated thereunder.  
57   See Pezim, supra note 34; Asbestos Minority Shareholders, supra note 30.  
                                PRINCIPLES-BASED SECURITIES REGULATION  17 
 
 
dance prepared by BCSC staff in September 2004.58 Large chunks of the 
Securities Act currently in force simply have no equivalent in the proposed 
B.C legislation, in large part because the proposed legislation allocates 
the authority over more context-specific, detailed decision making to the 
Commission, pursuant to its rulemaking power.59  
 Consider, for example, Canadian prospectus requirements.  Both On-
tario and British Columbia (under both the existing Act and the proposed 
legislation) require that issuers file a prospectus and obtain a receipt for it 
before distributing or offering a security.  The statutes’ overarching provi-
sions are quite similar:60  
                                                  
58   See Table of Concordance: Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418 to Securities Act, S.B.C. 
2004, c. 43 (not in force), online: British Columbia Securities Commission 
<http://www.bcsc.bc.ca>. 
59   See Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.418 [BCSA]. The other important factor was sub-
stantive reform under the proposed B.C. Model, including especially its Continuous 
Market Access approach (Bill 38, supra note 53). 
60   Bill 38, supra note 41, ss. 18(1)-18(2); BCSA, supra note 60, ss. 61(1)-61(2); OSA, supra 
note 40, s. 53(1). 
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Bill 38 (the pro-
posed B.C. legisla-
tion) 
18 (1)  A person must not make an offering of a secu-
rity unless a prospectus for the security has 
been filed and the commission has issued a 
receipt for the prospectus. 
 (2) A prospectus filed under subsection (1) must 
be in the required form. 
B.C. Securities Act, 
R.S.B.C. 1996 (in 
force) 
61 (1)  Unless exempted under this Act or the regu-
lations, a person must not distribute a secu-
rity unless a preliminary prospectus and a 
prospectus respecting the security  
(a)  have been filed with the executive direc-
tor, and 
(b)  receipts obtained for them from the ex-
ecutive director. 
  (2) A preliminary prospectus and a prospectus  
must be in the required form.  
Ontario Securities 
Act 
53 (1) No person or company shall trade in a secu-
rity on his, her or its own account or on behalf 
of any other person or company where such 
trade would be a distribution of such security, 
unless a preliminary prospectus and a pro-
spectus have been filed and receipts therefor 
obtained from the Director. 
 
 Where the more rules based and principles based approaches diverge, 
however, is in the additional detail provided in the statute itself.  In the 
OSA and the existing BCSA, the general requirement above is accompa-
nied by additional provisions concerning, inter alia, amendments to pre-
liminary and final prospectuses (each of which receives distinct treat-
ment), certification requirements for issuers, directors, officers, under-
writers, etc., receipts, waiting periods, and distribution.61 By contrast, the 
                                                  
61   See OSA, supra note 40, ss. 57 (prospectus amendments), 58 (certificate by issuer), 59 
(certificate underwriter), 61 (prospectus receipt), 65 (waiting period), Part XVI (distri-
bution); BCSA, supra note 58, as at 2004, ss. 66 [repealed] (preliminary prospectus 
amendment), 67 [repealed] (prospectus amendment), 68 [repealed] (certificate of issuer), 
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proposed B.C. legislation locates many of those issues within its proposed 
Securities Rules, instead of the proposed statute.62 A similar shift toward 
greater reliance on Commission rule making powers is evident in the pro-
posed B.C. legislation around takeover and issuer bids, proxies, continu-
ous disclosure, and primary market civil liability.63 
 The second major distinguishing feature of more principles-based leg-
islation is that it tends to be structured in a more outcome-oriented, as 
opposed to process-oriented, manner. The notion of outcome-oriented 
regulation is so connected to the principles-based approach that in its 
submission to the Expert Panel, the BCSC expressed a preference for the 
term “outcomes-based” rather than “principles-based” to describe its ap-
proach.64 Outcome-oriented regulation measures performance against 
regulatory goals, whereas process-based regulation measures compliance 
with detailed procedural requirements.65 For example, both the OSA and 
      
69 [repealed] (certificate of underwriter), 65 (prospectus receipt), 78 (waiting period), 
Part XI (distribution). 
62   See especially “Securities Rules”, supra note 41 at Rules 93-104, 114-16. 
63   One of the wrinkles concerns where each principles-based regime locates its “core prin-
ciples” (see Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12 at 60-65). British Columbia and 
the FSA issued their Code/Principles through rule making, while the CFMA (supra 
note 44), and the QDA (supra note 14) chose to embed them directly into legislation. It 
seems that nothing substantive turns on the choice. 
64   Submission BCSC, supra note 13 at 4. See also Business Plan: 2009/10, online: Finan-
cial Services Authority <http://www.fsa.gov.uk > at 9. These regulators prefer the terms 
“outcomes-oriented” or “outcomes-focused” primarily due to confusion around the term 
“principles-based”, and not because they see the terms as interchangeable. Principles-
based and outcome-oriented regulation are different concepts and should not be con-
flated;  for example, one could have a system that is rule-based and outcome-oriented. 
However, principles-based and outcome-oriented regulation share philosophical convic-
tions about the purposes of regulation and the most effective means for achieving regu-
latory goals.  
   Secondary market civil liability was not part of the existing BCSA in 2004, when 
the proposed legislation was drafted, so we cannot compare the structure there.  Note, 
also, that the principles-based regimes diverge in terms of where they locate their “core 
principles” (see Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12, at 60-65).  British Colum-
bia and the FSA issued their Code/Principles through rule making, while the CFMA 
(supra note 44), and the QDA (supra note 14) chose to embed them directly into legisla-
tion.  All of these Codes/Principles are actually pitched at similar levels of precision—
i.e., they are all cast in terms of high level principles.  There is no intention that they 
should be regularly amended based on regulatory experience.  Therefore purely in 
terms of regulatory design they should probably be part of the statute rather than the 
rules, although there may have been practical considerations at play as well.  It seems 
that nothing substantive turns on the choice. 
65   In actual practice, there is no necessary disconnect between outcome-oriented regula-
tion and a third approach that some scholars call management-based regulation. See 
Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, “Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals” (2003) 37 Law & Soc'y Rev. 691. There are dif-
ferences between the two concepts regarding the stage of firm conduct at which the 
regulator intervenes, but both place responsibility for detailed decision making with in-
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one part of the B.C. Model, its Code of Conduct for dealers and advisers66 
contain provisions that try to ensure that customers receive timely disclo-
sure of trades conducted on their account. However, the OSA establishes 
a strict procedure whereas the B.C. Code of Conduct only specifies an out-
come.67 We see similar differences in their approaches to dealer conflicts 
of interest.68 
 Another example is account supervision by broker-dealer firms. In 
2004, the BCSC commissioned a regulatory impact analysis that com-
pared the detailed, process-based account supervision requirements estab-
lished by the Investment Dealers Association (IDA), as it then was, with 
the more outcome-oriented requirements imagined under the proposed 
B.C. Code of Conduct for dealers and advisers.69 The Code of Conduct 
would have required a firm to “[m]aintain an effective system to ensure 
compliance with this Code, all applicable regulatory and other legal re-
quirements, and [its] own internal policies and procedures,” and to 
“[m]aintain an effective system to manage the risks associated with [its] 
business.”70 The four firms studied were of the view that the IDA rules,71 
which mandated transaction-based daily and monthly reviews, contrib-
uted significantly to their regulatory burden without providing meaning-
ful investor protection. From their perspective, the reviews were duplica-
tive, rigid—and, worst of all—not effective in detecting abuses character-
ized by patterns of behavior, which is where they thought the biggest 
compliance risks arose. As a result of these perceived limitations and in 
response to what the firms described as concerns about civil liability, 
reputation, and good business practice, each of the firms had already, by 
the time of the study, developed its own parallel risk-based supervisory 
      
dustry actors and give those actors the flexibility to design mechanisms that work for 
them based on their greater knowledge about their own businesses.  
66   Code of Conduct, being Schedule of the Securities Rules, supra note 40 [Code of Con-
duct]. See also Securities Regulation in British Columbia: Guide for Dealers and Advis-
ers, online: British Columbia Securities Commission <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca> at 32 
[Guide for Dealers]. 
67   See OSA, supra note 40, s. 36; Christina Wolf, Strong and Efficient Investor Protection: 
Dealers and Advisers under the BC Model— A Regulatory Impact Analysis (24 Novem-
ber 2003), online: British Columbia Securities Commission ‹http://www.bcsc.bc.ca› at 72 
(Principle 8). 
68   Compare OSA, supra note 64, s. 39 and Wolf, supra note 65 at 66 (Principle 6). 
69   Wolf, supra note 65 at 48-57.   Of course, primary responsibility for overseeing dealers 
and advisors is subdelegated to self-regulatory organiztions (SRO) – most prominently 
IIROC and the Mutal Fund Dealers Association of Canada. Those SROs would have to 
be active participants in any change to a more principles-based approach. 
70   See Code of Conduct, supra note 64, Principle 19. See also Guide, supra note 64 at 31-
32.  
71   See generally, Guide for Dealers, supra note 64 at 13-15, 17. 
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system.72 The regulatory impact analysis concluded that relative to the ex-
isting system, B.C.’s proposed Code of Conduct would, by permitting firms 
to focus their energies on their effective internal risk-management sys-
tems, improve investor protection, allow firms to innovate to achieve regu-
latory objectives in the ways that were most efficient for their businesses, 
and reduce compliance costs.  
 We return to some of the difficulties associated with reliance on inter-
nal risk models below.73 The point here is that outcome orientation has 
important implications for the approach to regulation. By definition, out-
come-oriented regulation accepts that there may be more than one means 
(i.e., more than one process) to achieve a regulatory goal. It transfers deci-
sion making about process from regulators to industry. The essential as-
sumption underlying both principles-based and outcome-oriented regula-
tion is that legislators and regulators are in the best position to develop 
regulatory goals, but may not be in the best position to devise process-
based means for achieving those goals. One of the reasons that outcome-
oriented regulation is attractive is that it establishes a more direct rela-
tionship between regulatory goals and regulatory requirements.  Out-
come-oriented regulation translates regulatory goals directly and trans-
parently into the outcomes that industry is required to meet. By contrast, 
process-oriented requirements that are developed by regulators in ad-
vance, even though regulators possess less contextual information than 
industry actors, may not be perfectly tailored to regulatory goals. Process-
oriented regulation can also permit market participants to abide by the 
letter of the law while ignoring its spirit. This is especially the case when 
it comes to highly complex instruments, or in areas where events are fast-
moving and regulators on their own could not hope to keep up with the 
pace of innovation.  
 Fundamental to an outcome-oriented system is the existence or devel-
opment of an “interpretive community”74 that collectively develops, on a 
rolling basis, the detailed content of statutory principles. In order to func-
tion transparently and predictably, a principles-based system must build 
in mechanisms that allow regulators to communicate with industry about 
                                                  
72   For an example of the limitations that the firms found frustrating, see generally ibid. at 
14-17. 
73   Reliance on internal risk-management analysis in the context of Basel II and the Con-
solidated Supervised Entities Program at the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission are discussed in “The Global Financial Crisis,” below. 
74    Stanley Fish, Is There A Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Julia Black, Rules and Regulators 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at 30-37 [Black, Rules and Regulators]; Julia Black, 
“Talking about Regulation” (1998) Public Law 77; Sol Picciotto, “Constructing Compli-
ance: Game Playing, Tax Law, and the Regulatory State” (2007) 29 Law & Pol’y 11; 
Capital Markets, supra note 2. 
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their expectations, and that both allow and require industry to speak 
openly and regularly with regulators about their processes. Communica-
tion can take place through a number of channels including official ad-
ministrative guidance, speeches, “no action” or “Dear CEO” letters, com-
pliance audits, comments on industry standards, or specific enforcement 
actions. Over time, such communication can help develop an interpretive 
community that understands regulatory expectations, and can usefully in-
terpret regulatory pronouncements about “reasonableness” or “effective-
ness” in different situations. 
 Principles-based securities regulation is thus a particular way of 
structuring regulation, not a decision to do away with rules. Principles-
based regulation is based on the conviction that while legislators and 
statutory drafters have the public legitimacy to establish broad regulatory 
goals, they are not in the best position to develop detailed guidelines for 
industry conduct, especially in fast-moving arenas like securities regula-
tion. Those powers are allocated to frontline regulators at the securities 
commissions, whose expertise derives from their proximity to industry 
and whose accountability derives from the notice-and-comment aspect of 
their rulemaking powers. Moreover—and this is the crucial point today—
even those front line regulators are limited in their access to information 
by comparison to the industries they regulate. In order to remain relevant 
and informed about fast-moving industry practice, to keep regulation suf-
ficiently flexible, and to avoid inhibiting productive innovation, regulators 
need to establish open and perpetual communication lines with industry. 
They need to use industry’s own good and best practices to add the “meat” 
of detail to the “bones” of their principles-based regulatory expectations.  
 Described another way, principles-based regulation is a two-tiered ap-
proach, in which principles-based legislative drafting provides flexibility, 
to which constantly evolving industry experience and regulatory rules add 
certainty on a rolling basis. In this formulation principles-based regula-
tion, as applied, avoids the biggest problems associated with both princi-
ples and rules, at the level of theory.  Moreover, it can produce more effec-
tive regulation by ensuring that the party that has access to the best in-
formation is the one that provides the detail on any particular issue.”    
What the GFC may suggest to us is that this “beyond theory” perspective 
is still idealized, and that its promise was not achieved in practice. How 
real-life experience fell short of expectations is described in the next part, 
followed by a discussion of three large lessons learned. 
II. The Global Financial Crisis 
 At least three major arguments contend that the GFC does not repre-
sent even a superficial challenge to principles-based securities regulation. 
First, the most alarming problems originated with complex securitized 
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products that were distributed through exempt private-market place-
ments, entirely bypassing the public securities markets where the full 
panoply of regulatory safeguards would have applied. Second, the GFC 
has far more to do with gaps in regulation than with drafting choices. 
Gaps in regulation, especially around prudential regulation of players in 
the so-called “shadow banking system” in the United States, were surely 
the most obvious and consequential aspect of regulatory failure.75 The as-
set-backed commercial paper (ABCP) crisis in Canada in August 2007 re-
volved around paper sold under an exemption from securities regulation.76 
Credit-rating agencies, which utterly failed as gatekeepers,77 were drasti-
cally under-regulated.78 Third, the GFC was a global event. The complex 
securitization technology that increased risky lending, decreased trans-
parency, and multiplied and spread risk79 was not unique to principles-
based jurisdictions. Even within the core concerns of securities regulation, 
national systems traditionally described as rules-based—specifically, that 
of the United States—demonstrably fared no better than the more princi-
ples-based system at the United Kingdom’s FSA. While many specific 
components of financial and securities regulation, ranging from pruden-
tial regulation and systemic risk analysis to the basic usefulness of the ex-
                                                  
75   See Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform, supra note 7; Patricia 
A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, “Systemic Risk through Securitiza-
tion: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure” (2009) 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1327. 
Observers have also pointed out that the SEC, which had primary oversight of most 
Wall Street investment bank functions, was not well equipped to conduct prudential fi-
nancial regulation (Coffee & Sale, supra note 8). 
76   See Prospectus and Registration Exemptions, NI 45-106, B.C. Reg. 269/2005, s. 2.35. 
This Instrument exempts trades in commercial paper maturing not more than one year 
from the date of issue, and having an approved credit rating from an approved credit 
rating agency. 
77   See Roger Lowenstein, “Triple-A Failure” The New York Times Magazine (27 April 
2008) 36, online: The New York Times Magazine <http://www.nytimes.com/magazine>. 
See especially Frank Partnoy, “The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two 
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies” (1999) 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 619. 
78   Historically, credit-rating agencies in Canada and the United States have operated 
with relatively little regulatory scrutiny. In the United States, oversight has largely 
fallen upon the SEC, which has chosen to rely solely on ratings from “nationally recog-
nized statistical rating organizations” (NRSRO]. The SEC imposes stringent require-
ments before an agency can be recognized as a NRSRO. This, coupled with high entry 
barriers, has produced a situation in which three agencies dominate the market for 
credit ratings. For further information on the regulation of credit-rating agencies in the 
United States., see Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the 
Operation of the Securities Markets: As Required by Section 702(b) of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, online: Securities and Exchange Commision <http://www.sec.gov> at 
5-10. Legislation has recently been proposed in the U.S. to introduce additional regula-
tory oversight and to curb many of the failings associated with the current rating re-
gime. See U.S., Bill H.R. 3817, Investor Protection Act of 2009, 111th Cong. , 2009 . 
79   See e.g. McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter, supra note 75. 
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isting disclosure-based model80 are legitimately being re-examined, they 
are being re-examined globally.  
A. Risk and Reward: Devolution of Details to Industry 
 Where the GFC should provoke reflection, however, is with regard to 
the role of devolution to industry. Here, the GFC does represent a chal-
lenge (though I would argue not a fundamental one) to principles-based 
regulation. Principles-based regulation works by devolving the details of 
regulation to industry, on the assumption that industry has the best in-
formation and is in the best position to both assess and bear its own risks. 
While not essential to principles-based regulation, this devolution is a 
central reason for the advantage of principles-based regulation over rules-
based regulation in fast-moving environments. Devolution of the details to 
industry, however, went on to play a central role in enabling some of the 
most painfully aggravating conditions associated with the U.S. subprime 
mortgage meltdown. This need not have been the case. Crucially, devolu-
tion does not automatically imply weak public oversight. Nevertheless, 
devolution accompanied by an ideology of self-regulation contributed to 
insufficient oversight of the massive expansion of the over-the-counter 
market for derivatives within which credit default swaps (CDS) traded, 
following the passage of the CFMA.81 Other examples of devolution in-
cluded Basel II82 and, correspondingly, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) approval in 2004 of alternative net capital 
requirements for the leading investment banks under the Consolidated 
Supervised Entities Program (CSE Program).83 These initiatives allowed 
banks and investment banks to maintain capital reserves based on their 
own internal risk-assessment models, with very little scrutiny from regu-
lators.  
                                                  
80   Steven L. Schwarcz, “Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis” (2008) 
Utah L. Rev. 1109. 
81   See Stephen Labaton & Timothy L. O’Brien, “Financiers Plan to Put Controls on De-
rivatives” The New York Times (7 January 1999) C1 (discussing the move towards self-
regulation in derivative markets, prior to the GFC); Testimony of Christopher Cox, 
“Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sposored En-
tities, Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions ” (23 September 2008) , 
online: Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
<http://www.sec.gov> (recognizing a lack of regulatory oversight in the market for CDS 
and other derivative products). 
82   Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Meas-
urement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (June 2004), online: Bank for 
International Settlements <http://www.bis.org>. 
83   Securities and Exchange Commmission, “Alternative Net Capital Requirements for 
Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities”, online: (2004) 69 
Federal Register 118 ‹http://www.sec.gov›. See also Stephen Labaton, “Agency’s ’04 Rule 
Let Banks Pile Up New Debt” The New York Times (3 October 2008) A1. 
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 Regulatory faith in industry actors’ competence, if not literally their 
bona fides, proved to have been misplaced to catastrophic effect. George 
Soros has charged that the GFC reflects a “shocking abdication of respon-
sibility” on the part of regulators.84 Investment banks and others engaged 
in originating, structuring, and selling financial products engaged in 
breathtakingly bad behaviour. There was real dishonesty.85 The firms also 
made grave errors in safeguarding even their own interests. In the hands 
of in-house financial economists, academic caveats about the limitations of 
efficient markets theory (EMT) models86 as well as limits of valuation 
models were ploughed under.87 Predictable psychological irrationalities 
seem to have been at work within firms, including groupthink, overconfi-
dence, self-serving biases, and excessive faith in “hard” numbers, which 
were not accounted for in the regulatory decision to devolve the details to 
industry. There is also a strong public-choice narrative: banks had little 
incentive to behave prudently in building tranches of consumer debt-
based securities because they sold them to third parties, in a market ea-
ger to buy them.88 At a structural level, banks may have focused on short-
term gain at the expense of long-term value because they were public cor-
porations, not partnerships, and because bank CEOs were compensated 
based on short-term earnings.89  
 Regulators also seem to have underestimated the degree to which in-
dustry actors would try to avoid or circumvent regulatory oversight. 
Whether out of short-term self-interest, economic pressure, or simple lack 
                                                  
84   George Soros, “The worst market crisis in 60 years” Financial Times (U.K.) (23 January 
2008). 
85   See e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 77; Les Christie, “Mortgage fraud still soaring: A 
crackdown on underwriting has failed to halt an explosion of fraudulent home loans” 
CNNmoney.com (26 August 2008), online: CNNmoney.com <http://money.cnn.com>  
86   For a discussion of the future of the “efficient-markets hypothesis”, see “Efficiency and 
beyond; Financial economics” The Economist (18 July 2009), (QL) [“Efficiency and Be-
yond”]. 
87   See e.g. Joe Nocera, “Risk Mismanagement: Were the Measures Used to Evaluate Wall 
Street Trades Flawed?” The New York Times Magazine (2 January 2009) 24, online: 
The New York Times Magazine <http://www.nytimes.com/magazine> (describing the 
oversimplification of the  “value at risk” model in banking practice); Felix Salmon, “Rec-
ipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street” Wired Magazine (23 February 
2009), online: Wired <http://www.wired.com> (describing oversimplification of Li’s 
gaussian copula in banking practice). 
88   Ben S. Bernanke, “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit” (Re-
marks at the Sandridge Lecture, delivered at the Virginia Association of Economics, 
Richmond, 10 March 2005), online: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov>. 
89   Lucien A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, “Regulating Bankers’ Pay” (2010) 98 Geo. L.J. 
247. See also Michael Lewis, “The End” Portfolio.com (11 November 2008), online: Port-
folio.com <http://www.portfolio.com> (blaming Wall Street excesses for the decision to 
take investment banks public). 
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of understanding,90 firms within the CSE Program that applied the alter-
native net capital requirements valued illiquid assets too generously, un-
derestimated long-tail risks, and maintained inadequate capital buffers, 
all the while arguing that their behaviour was reducing rather than exac-
erbating risk. Firms innovated in structured products, not only to reflect 
increasing sophistication or in order to make their product more attrac-
tive to purchasers, but also sometimes to avoid regulation.91 They avoided 
comparability in order to reduce transparency and make it harder for 
regulators to understand what they were selling.92 
 Each of these factors, even in isolation, represents a considerable chal-
lenge to what Julia Black has termed the “regulatory Utopia”, within 
which the self-examining, responsible firm, possessing the greatest con-
textual information, helps to elaborate the content of principles-based 
regulation through ongoing dialogue with a flexible and outcome-oriented 
regulator, in the service of the mutual goal of optimized regulation.93 
What follows below is a dissection of the ways in which the self-regulatory 
regimes that gained so much traction in the past decade differ from prin-
ciples-based regulation when buttressed by an active regulatory presence. 
Only after we have a sense of the underlying structure of the principles-
based project can we assess what it slipped to in recent practice, and what 
aspects of it remain vital. 
                                                  
90   See David Brooks, “Greed and Stupidity” The New York Times (3 April 2009) A29  (con-
trasting two theories explaining decision-making failures at financial institutions). Pre-
cisely why financial institutions managed risk so poorly is an important question, the 
answer to which is also multi-factorial and varies from one firm to another. 
91   This may be the least of it. As Martin Wolf has pointed out, “an enormous part of what 
banks did in the early part of this decade—the off-balance-sheet vehicles, the deriva-
tives and the ‘shadow banking system’ itself – was to find a way round regulation.” “Re-
form of regulation has to start by altering incentives” Financial Times (U.K.) (24 June 
2009). 
92   See Julia Hoggett, “Crossing the Atlantic: Can Covered Bonds Gain Real Penetration in 
the United States?” in Jonathan Golin, ed., Covered Bonds: Beyond Pfandbriefe: Inno-
vations, Investment and Structured Alternatives (London: Euromoney Books, 2006) 320 
at 323 (indicating the lack of legislation in the American market for covered bonds, 
which produces products that lack the standardization and comparability of their 
European counterparts). Recent legislative initiatives have shown an interest in stan-
dardizing certain over- the-counter (OTC) derivative products, in an effort to mititgate 
systemic risk. See e.g. Patricia White, “Over-the-Counter Derivatives” Before the Sen-
ate Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment, Committee of Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (22 June 2009), online: Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System <http://www.federalreserve.gov>. 
93   Black, “Forms and Paradoxes”, supra note 46 at 10. 
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B. Enforced Self-Regulation and Principles-Based Regulation 
 Principles-based regulation is not the same thing as self-regulation. 
Nevertheless, the distinction between principles-based regulation and 
self-regulation has not always been adequately emphasized. Competition 
between jurisdictions for increasingly mobile global capital played a role 
in obscuring the distinction. Large financial firms’ ability to relocate to 
more “competitive” regulatory environments provoked regulators and pol-
icy makers to focus on the costs of substantive regulation. The rhetoric of 
principles-based regulation became enmeshed with the rhetoric of effi-
ciency and the need to control the regulatory burden. Arguments in fa-
vour of principles-based regulation from Henry Paulsen, for example, 
tended to emphasize the free-market benefits and reduced regulatory 
burden associated with the FSA approach—not its asserted regulatory 
oversight benefits.94 Some, concerned about London’s increased capital 
market share in the last few years, asserted that its success with princi-
ples-based approach was the result of lower standards and lax oversight 
under principles-based regulation, especially in its junior market.95 Lon-
don-based regulators naturally disputed this assessment.96  
 The March 2009 Turner Review insightfully describes the regulatory 
worldview that failed to anticipate the problems identified above.97 Lord 
Adair Turner, now FSA Chairman, was commissioned by the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer in October 2008 to review the causes of the financial cri-
sis and make recommendations about regulatory changes. According the 
Turner Review, the FSA did not fail because it embraced principles-based 
regulation. Indeed, principles-based regulation is barely mentioned.98 In-
                                                  
94   See Department of the Treasury, Press Release, hp-174, “Remarks by Treasury Secre-
tary Henry M. Paulson on the Competitiveness of U.S. Capital Markets Economic Club 
of New York” (20 November 2006), online: Department of the Treasury 
<http://www.treas.gov>. See also “Sustaining New York’s and the US’ Global Financial 
Services Leadership” (2007), online: The City of New York Office of the Mayor 
<http://www.abanet.org > at 13 (blaming the heavy regulatory burden in the United 
States for the shift in business to London). 
95   See John Gapper, “Thain lambasts Aim standards,” Financial Times (26 January 2007) 
online: Financial Times 
<http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto012620071731342399>. 
96   See e.g., Clara Furse, “Sox is not to blame - London is just better as a market” Financial 
Times (U.K.) (19 September 2006); John Tiner, “Better Regulation: Objective or Oxymo-
ron” (Speech delivered at the SII Annual Conference, 9 May 2006), online: Financial 
Services Authority 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/0509_jt.shtml>. 
97   Turner, supra note 5. 
98   Notwithstanding premature and ultimately inaccurate reports by credible U.K. media 
sources that principles-based regulation would be abandoned.  See Peter Thal Larsen & 
Jennifer Hughes, “Sants Takes a Fresh View of Regulator’s Principles,” Financial 
Times  (13 March 2009), online: FT.com <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6ecc49d0-0f70-11de-
ba10-0000779fd2ac.html>. 
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stead, Lord Turner ascribes blame to flaws in FSA philosophy—that is, to 
a hands-off, market-based regulatory approach that assumed: markets 
were generally self-correcting; market discipline could be trusted to con-
tain risk; primary responsibility for managing risk lay with senior man-
agement not regulators, because senior management has better informa-
tion; and consumers were best protected through unfettered and trans-
parent markets, not product regulation or direct intervention.99 
 Lord Turner is correct to draw a distinction between the FSA’s stance 
in favour of industry self-regulation and its principles-based approach. To 
equate principles-based regulation unequivocally with self-regulation 
would be to misunderstand both. The two are not inconsistent, nor are 
they synonymous. Self-regulation refers to the degree of public interven-
tion in private industry. Neither principles-based nor rules-based regula-
tion guarantees any particular stance toward self-regulation. Principles-
based regulation is a particular regulatory approach that may or may not 
be highly interventionist, depending on how it is implemented, even 
though its effectiveness relies on pulling industry’s own experience and 
information into regulatory expectations. Indeed, some opponents to prin-
ciples-based regulation are primarily concerned about the possibility that 
such an approach would allow regulators to overreach, especially in the 
enforcement context.100 Whether a principles-based approach amounts to 
lax regulation, overzealous regulation, or (impossibly) pitch-perfect regu-
lation is a function of how, and how well, it is implemented. 
 Principles-based regulation as properly understood inevitably requires 
a robust and capable public role, including meaningful enforcement.101 
Principles-based regulation is not code for a position that promotes allow-
ing industry to do an end run around the regulator. It is a conceptually 
consistent outgrowth of the loose group of regulatory perspectives vari-
ously known as new governance,102 co-regulation,103 enforced self-
                                                  
99   Equally fundamental, but best put in the category of regulatory gaps rather than regu-
latory approaches, was failure in the oversight of systemic risk. See Turner, supra note 
5 at 52. 
100   See e.g. Briefing from Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (February 2007) “FSA Prin-
ciples-Based Regulation: What Should Firms Be Doing Differently?”, online: Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer <http://www.freshfields.com> at 2.  
101   Ford, “New Governance”, supra note 2 (“a credible enforcement function writ large 
(meaning both compliance oversight and prosecution where needed) is a necessary 
component of principles-based and outcome-oriented regulation” at 32); see also Cristie 
L. Ford, “Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement” (2005) 57 Admin. L. 
Rev. 757 (arguing for continued focus on enforcement within new governance scholar-
ship).  
102   Ford, “New Governance”, supra note 2 (arguing that principles-based securities 
regulation is a new governance innovation). The term “principles-based regulation” is 
the dominant one in securities regulation, likely for path-dependent reasons stemming 
from post-Enron concerns about whether the United States’ Generally Accepted Ac-
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regulation,104 or “responsive regulation”.105 New governance and its vari-
ants are not the same as self-regulation.106 According to its proponents, 
new governance scholarship exists explicitly for the purpose of making the 
public state more, not less, central and relevant.107 To use Jerry Mashaw’s 
recent formulation, new governance represents a different balance be-
tween the available public, market, and social mechanisms for ensuring 
      
counting Principles (GAAP) rules were too rules-based. However, some scholars would 
argue that new governance methods transcend the rules-versus-principles debate. See 
Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, “Legal Accountability in 
the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform,” (2009) 34 Law & 
Soc. Inquiry 523 (arguing that new governance, or “experimentalist”, practice resolves 
“the rules/standard antimony” debate through a “simultaneous emphasis on articula-
tion and flexibility” at 536-37, 554-56). In spite of differences in terminology and em-
phasis, the fully articulated version of what I call principles-based regulation is not in 
tension with what Noonan, Sabel and Simon describe. These authors find it most useful 
to frame the phenomenon as a pragmatic, practical method that bypasses an unproduc-
tive theoretical conversation. I find it most useful to focus on principles-based regula-
tion as a first-order decision that reflects an appreciation of the relative capacities of 
legislative drafters, regulators, and industry actors. Nevertheless, my version of princi-
ples-based regulation calls for careful attention to implementation mechanisms that 
pull detailed industry knowledge into the articulation of those principles, in a way that 
is strongly similar to what Noonan, Sabel and Simon describe. See also Ford, “New 
Governance”, supra note 2 at 30, n. 111.  
103   Edward J. Balleisen & Marc Eisner, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: 
How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose” in David Moss 
& John Cisternino, eds., New Perspectives on Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Tobin Pro-
ject, 2009) 127. 
104  John Braithwaite, “Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Con-
trol” (1982) 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1466.  
105  Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). I am not suggesting that these perspec-
tives are coterminous in terms of precisely how “top-down” or “bottom-up” they are de-
signed to be, among other things. For a description of the difference between co-
regulation and (enforced) self-regulation in the European Union, see e.g. Linda Senden, 
“Soft Law, Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in European Law: Where Do They 
Meet?”, online: (2005) 9:1 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law <http://www.ejcl.org>. 
A full dissection of the differences is beyond this paper’s scope. The point for present 
purposes is that each of these approaches, like principles-based regulation, tries to 
identify an effective regulatory method located between rigid and unresponsive com-
mand-and-control regulation on one hand, and voluntary self-regulation on the other. 
106  See e.g. On Amir & Orly Lobel, “Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics 
Informs Law and Policy”, Book Review, (2008) 108 Colum. L. Rev. 2098 at 2132-36. 
107  See e.g. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
talism” (1998) 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267; Jody Freeman, “The Private Role in Public Gov-
ernance” (2000) 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 543; William H. Simon, “Optimization and its Discon-
tents in Regulatory Design” (unpublished paper on file with author). But see Martha 
Minow, “Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion (2003) 116 
Harv. L. Rev. 1229; Donald F Kettl, Government by Proxy: Mismanaging Federal Pro-
grams (1987); H.W. Arthurs, “The Administrative State goes to Market (and Cries ‘Wee 
Wee Wee’ all the Way Home)” (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 797. 
30    (2010) 55  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
accountability, putting greater emphasis on the latter two.108 It imagines 
a different role for the regulator than rules-based, command-and-control 
regulation does. However, it does not suggest that public accountability, 
in the form of state action, could could ever be ignored. 
 How exactly to best enforce self-regulatory models is a matter of some 
debate. Different models exist. Ex post enforcement actions play a much 
larger role in U.S. securities regulation than they do in the United King-
dom, which focuses more on ex ante supervision and compliance work.109 
The impact of civil liability also needs to be considered.110 When it comes 
to principles-based regulation, Black is probably correct when she writes 
that “principles need enforcement to give them credibility but over-
enforcement can lead to their demise.”111 A growing body of scholarship 
exists concerning how to make enforced self-regulatory systems effective 
and credible using supervision, outcome-oriented problem solving, negoti-
ated compliance, and firm penetration through compliance audits.112 En-
forcement in a principles-based system (including referral for criminal 
prosecution if necessary) likely works best as the culmination of a series 
                                                  
108  Jerry L. Mashaw, “Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the 
Grammar of Governance” in Michael W. Dowdle, ed., Public Accountability: Designs, Di-
lemmas and Experiences (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 115.   
109  John C. Coffee Jr., “Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement”, online: (2007) 
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper 304, online: Social Science Research 
Network <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=967482> (identifying the 
United States as an “outlier” in the frequency and magnitude of its enforcement ac-
tions); Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, “Public and Private Enforcement of Securities 
Laws: Resource-Based Evidence” (2009) Harvard Public Law and Legal Theory Re-
search Paper Series 08-28 at 31, online: Social Science Research Network 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1000086>.  
110  Some have also argued that principles-based regulation is not viable in the United 
States because of the extraordinary civil liability risks in that jurisdiction. See Peter J. 
Wallison, “Fad or Reform: Can Principles-Based Regulation Work in the United 
States?” Financial Services Outlook (June 2007), online: American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research <http://www.aei.org>. This is probably less of a concern in 
Canada. There may be a risk, however, that courts will become closely involved in defin-
ing the meaning of principles, if civil liability becomes the driving force for such inter-
pretations. This will affect the regulator’s ability to develop those principles within the 
regulatory sphere (Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12 at 24-25). 
111  Black, “Forms and Paradoxes”, supra note 46 at 29. 
112  See e.g. Malcolm K. Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Prob-
lems, and Managing Compliance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000) (de-
scribes problem-solving techniques in enforcement); Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 
105; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984) (on 
“tit-for-tat”). Comply-or-explain protocols, such as those on corporate governance under 
the E.U. Combined Code, may also be instructive, along with the historical story of the 
evolution of compliance analysis following the Barings Bank disaster. See Janet Dine, 
“The Regulation of Derivatives: Identifying Difficulties and Creating Models of Regula-
tion” in Alastair Hudson, ed., Modern Financial Techniques, Derivatives and Law (Lon-
don: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 135 at 151-54. 
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of such interactions with an industry actor, ratcheted up through an en-
forcement pyramid approach.113 Once at the enforcement stage, especially 
when dealing with cases based on violation of a principle alone, bringing 
enforcement actions successfully calls for substantial confidence and forti-
tude on the part of regulators. Enforcement staffers must also be watchful 
for potential procedural fairness concerns.114 
 The GFC represents an important lesson for some new governance 
scholarship, which has not always been particularly interested.115 Indeed, 
the shortfall between the promise of an inspiring theoretical model and its 
application to real-life regulation makes the problem more, not less, im-
portant to solve. What was missing from many aspects of financial regula-
tion, in retrospect, was meaningful accountability. The pressing questions 
now are why pre-GFC systems did not incorporate adequate public ac-
countability mechanisms, and how principles-based securities regulation 
in Canada might avoid similar pitfalls. What follows are three recommen-
dations for charting a path forward for principles-based regulation in 
Canada in the wake of the GFC. These recommendations take as a start-
ing point that principles-based regulation must be buttressed by meaning-
ful regulatory oversight, and then they move beyond that to a closer re-
view of what accountability demands. The recommendations focus on 
problems of complexity and capacity, and the compromising effect that a 
lack of diversity and independent mindedness can have on effective regu-
latory oversight.  
III. Lessons Learned and Steps Forward 
A. Four Points on Regulatory Capacity 
 It turns out, as if there were ever any doubt, that how principles are 
implemented is at least as important as how legislation is drafted.116 As 
observed earlier, certainty in a principles-based regulatory regime has 
less to do with how a particular provision is drafted and more to do with 
the development of an interpretive community that defines the content of 
                                                  
113  Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 103. 
114  See Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12 at 32-34. 
115  Amy J. Cohen, “Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves” 
(2008) 33 Law & Soc. Inquiry 503 at 514-15, 529-30. 
116  Indeed, implementation may be more important than optimal statutory design, given 
that both the United Kingdom’s FSA and the BCSC have adopted more principles-
based approaches, notwithstanding enabling statutes that are not particularly princi-
ples-based. See Focusing on the Outcomes, supra note 1 (dicussing the FSA regulatory 
philosophy); 2004 B.C. Securities, supra note 1 (“Although the 2004 act is not in force, 
the BCSC has moved ahead with changing [its] regulatory processes and approach in 
much the same way [it] would have done under the 2004 act”). 
32    (2010) 55  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
that provision.117 What is required is a regulator that is capable of func-
tioning as an independent and credible member within that interpretive 
community—that is, a regulator that has a clear sense of its distinct role 
as a voice on behalf of the public interest. Moreover, because so much in-
terpretive discretion rests in the regulator’s hands, regulatory capacity, 
training, judgment, and philosophy are critically important to effective 
implementation. It is therefore crucial to think carefully about the struc-
ture through which principles will be translated into regulatory practice.  
 Working well with principles-based regulation requires considerable 
changes to traditional regulatory culture. Moving to a new model would 
take time and training.118 A principles-based regulator focuses on defining 
broad themes, articulating them in a flexible and outcome-oriented way, 
accepting input from industry, and managing incoming information effec-
tively. This requires expertise, a more ongoing communicative relation-
ship with industry, restraint in providing administrative guidance, and 
the continued use of notice-and-comment rule-making where appropri-
ate.119 Principles-based regulation relies on good and best practices 
emerging from industry to help define the content of principles-based 
regulatory requirements. Using good and best practices, which evolve, as 
opposed to potentially static industry standards, allows regulatory expec-
tations to evolve and remain flexible. It also builds-in a learning process 
for both regulators (who are learning from industry about what works in 
different contexts) and regulatees (who are learning from each other.) 
This shift in emphasis does not, however, require that regulators “roll 
over and play dead” in the face of industry demands. 
1. Lesson One: Effective Regulatory Capacity Requires Adequate 
Number of Staff 
 At the first and most fundamental level, regulatory capacity in this 
new environment requires an adequate number of staff. As Black has 
pointed out, principles-based regulation (like risk-based regulation) may 
be more hands-off in its approach to the details, but this does not mean 
that it requires fewer regulatory resources. Depending on choices about 
implementation, principles-based regulation may actually require inten-
                                                  
117  Black, Rules and Regulators, supra note 70; see also Capital Markets, supra note 2. 
118  See Robin Ford, “Principles-Based Regulation: Financial Services Authority (U.K.)” in 
Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada: Canada Steps Up, vol. 7, 
online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation <http://www.tfmsl.ca> 101 at 
105-108 (describing the former BCSC Commissioner’s experience with change man-
agement at the FSA, including obstacles the FSA faced in implementing an outcome-
oriented, principles-based system and the tools the FSA used to help staff adjust).  
119  See e.g. Black, “Making a Success”, supra note 2. 
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sive interaction with firms, at least around certain issues or situations.120 
Yet, as the Northern Rock debacle in the United Kingdom highlighted, 
the FSA was far from adequately staffed.121 Its Major Retail Groups Divi-
sion was reduced by some twenty staff between 2004 and 2008, notwith-
standing the Division’s responsibility for substantial and complex FSA 
priorities such as Basel and the Treating Customers Fairly initiative, in 
addition to its core firm risk-assessment work.122  
2. Lesson Two: Regulators Must Have Transparent and Reliable 
Information about Industry 
 The example of the SEC’s CSE Program is even more striking.123 Its 
Division of Trading and Markets had only seven staffers and no executive 
director, yet since March 2007, it was charged with overseeing five other-
wise unregulated major broker-dealer firms, which formed the backbone 
of the American-based shadow banking industry, based on an alternative 
capital adequacy method. One of the effects of understaffing was that 
Trading and Markets staff had not completed any inspections of the Divi-
sion’s subject firms in the eighteen months prior to the collapse of Bear 
Stearns in September 2008.124 This lack of oversight would have been 
problematic in any event, but it was even more catastrophic in an out-
come-oriented system where so much of the detailed procedural design for 
achieving regulatory goals was delegated to industry. As we all now know, 
the firms’ models, which assessed largely illiquid assets operating both in 
the absence of price discovery and of backstop prudential regulation, 
proved woefully inadequate. 
 Second, regulators must have the ability to obtain transparent and re-
liable information about the industry actors they oversee. Even today, 
there can be no disputing that industry actors have better and more up-
                                                  
120  See ibid. (describing U.K. Treat Customers Fairly rules, which require registrants to 
demonstrate that they are in fact treating customers fairly at every stage.) 
121  The FSA acknowledged extraordinarily high turnover of FSA staff directly supervising 
the bank, inadequate numbers of staff, and very limited direct contact with bank execu-
tives among the reasons for its “unacceptable” regulatory performance. See FSA Inter-
nal Audit Division, The Supervision of Northern Rock: A Lessons Learned Review 
(March 2008), online: Financial Services Authority <http://www.fsa.gov.uk> [FSA, 
Northern Rock]. 
122  Ibid. 
123  This is also a regulatory gap story. The CSE Program was voluntary, reportedly de-
signed as a response to the fact that no U.S. agency had regulatory authority over cer-
tain investment-bank holding companies. See  SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Re-
lated Entities: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program, Report No. 446-A, (25 Sep-
tember 2008) at 81, online: Securities and Exchange Commission <http://www.sec.gov> 
(Chairman Cox’s comments) [SEC Oversight].   
124  SEC Oversight, supra note 123 at 49-50. 
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to-date information on their operations than regulators could hope to ob-
tain. The larger firms also have far superior resources. Yet these same ac-
tors have an interest in casting facts to their advantage, in making their 
products look as attractive as possible, and in reducing regulatory over-
sight where possible. Again, as hard experience at the FSA and the SEC 
demonstrates, simple information collection is a crucial first step. The 
post-mortem account of regulatory failure in the Northern Rock case iden-
tified a number of instances in which the FSA failed to collect, or did not 
have access to, the information necessary to accurately assess the risk 
that bank posed. Supervisors were found not to have been “proactive in 
ensuring there was a robust process allowing them a complete picture of 
issues.”125 The post-mortem analysis of the CSE Program recorded similar 
weaknesses. Among other things, the analysis identified instances in 
which the CSE staff failed to adequately track material issues in regu-
lated firms, approved changes to capital requirements before completing 
full inspections, and failed to exchange information with other SEC divi-
sions.126 In a system where information is power, such as in the regulation 
of the sale of complex derivative instruments, a regulator without the 
ability to obtain direct information effectively cedes the field to those it 
regulates.  
                                                  
125  FSA, Northern Rock, supra note 121 at 7. The findings of an internal audit into the 
FSA’s conduct in the Northern Rock affair demonstrated “a level of engagement and 
oversight by supervisory line management below the standard we would expect for a 
high impact firm” (ibid. at 4). But see Norma Cohen & Chris Giles, “Northern Rock 
Risk Revealed in 2004” Financial Times (30 May 2009), online: FT.com 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4cc9637a-4c8a-11de-a6c5-
00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1> [“Northern Rock Risk”] (reporting that the FSA 
had conducted “war games” in 2004 that identified the systemic risk that Northern 
Rock posed.) 
126  SEC Oversight, supra note 123 at 37-41. The SEC’s failures in oversight do not appear 
to be limited to the CSE Program. That agency’s review of its failure to detect and pre-
vent Bernard Madoff’s fraud also records that Mr. Madoff’s funds were overseen by in-
experienced or unsuitably skilled staff who conducted inadequate examinations, failed 
to verify information, and failed to respond to “red flags”. Additionally, investigations 
were delayed, questions were left unresolved, and SEC offices failed to communicate 
with each other. See  Investigation of Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff’s 
Ponzi Scheme: Report of Investigation Case, Report No. OIC-509, Public Version, (31 
August 2009), online: Securities and Exchange Commission <http://www.sec.gov> [In-
vestigation of Failure]. The SEC’s post-Madoff reforms include many of the initiatives 
recommended here, such as conducting surprise exams, recruiting staff with specialized 
experience, improving staff training, and seeking more resources. See  “The Securities 
and Exchange Commission Post-Madoff Reforms”, online: Securities and Exchange 
Commission <http://www.sec.gov>.   Donald C. Langevoort has described the SEC’s fail-
ings around the Madoff scandal sympathetically, though by no means optimistically, as 
a function of chronically inadequate resources (Don Longevoort, “The SEC and the 
Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in Search of a Story “ (2009) Michigan State Law Re-
view [forthcoming in 2010]). 
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 Principles-based regulation in conditions of complexity requires that 
regulators have and use robust investigatory powers where necessary, 
and that they conduct regular and adequate compliance audits. Like staff-
ing adequacy and information-gathering capability, effective compliance 
mechanisms are even more central in a principles-based environment. 
Compliance efforts give regulators access to essential, fine-grained infor-
mation about particular firms, and promote regulatory credibility and en-
gagement with industry. They are an important tool for developing and 
communicating the precise content of principles-based requirements to 
industry actors. As noted above, they are also part of a coordinated, multi-
faceted oversight approach for public companies and regulated entities, 
based on a carefully designed “enforcement pyramid” approach that also 
includes other supervisory strategies, as well as civil and criminal en-
forcement.127 
3. Lesson Three: Regulators Must Independently Scrutinize Information 
 Third, regulators in a principles-based system must have the capacity 
to independently scrutinize information.128 This requires considerable ca-
pacity in terms of information management systems. It also calls for 
quantitative expertise and industry experience. The FSA’s responses to 
Northern Rock, and its challenges in meeting them, may be instructive to 
Canadian securities regulators as they contemplate moving toward more 
principles-based regulation. The FSA plans to enhance its supervisory 
teams through increased staff, better training, a mandatory minimum 
number of staff per high-impact institution, and closer contact between 
senior staff and the biggest firms. It also plans to improve the quality of 
its staff, hiring risk specialists to support front-line supervision teams by 
focusing on the complex models used by banks to gauge financial risk.129 
                                                  
127  Ayres & Braithewaite, supra note 104; see also Ford, “New Governance”, supra note 2 
(consistent with the so-called enforcement pyramid, the “BCSC’s Capital Markets Regu-
lation Division uses a risk-based matrix to assess the risks presented by different in-
dustry actors, and it accords more leeway to firms that have demonstrated compliance 
bona fides” at 54, n. 170). See also Poonam Puri, “Enforcement Effectiveness in the Ca-
nadian Capital Markets: A Policy Analysis” (Presentation given to Capital Markets In-
stitute, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 14 June 2005), online: 
Rotman School of Management 
<http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/cmi/papers/Puri%20CMI%20Enforcement%20Presenta
tion.ppt>. 
128  See Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12 at 23. 
129  The FSA implemented a “supervisory enhancement program” in response to the failure 
of Northern Rock. See Hector Sants, “The FSA’s Supervisory Enhancement Pro-
gramme, in Response to the Internal Audit Report on Supervision of Northern Rock” 
(26 March 2008), online: Financial Services Authority <http://www.fsa.gov.uk>.  See 
also Turner, supra note 5 (describing the FSA’s new approach as “intensive supervi-
sion” at 88). Lord Turner describes intensive supervision as entailing significantly 
greater resources devoted to the supervision of high-impact firms, more intense focus on 
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As one commentator observed, the regulator will now be pursuing “the 
same PhD rocket scientists the banks are chasing. ... As Northern Rock 
shows, it’s not just about evaluating the problems, but having the people 
who can follow them up and forcefully make the case to the bank.”130 
 The need to hire “PhD rocket scientists” may seem peculiar, given that 
flawed quantitative analysis by in-house bank economists so drastically 
exacerbated the GFC in the first place.131 The fact that quantitative 
analysis has been abused, misapplied, and overgeneralized in the past, 
however, does not mean that banks will not use it in the future. In spite of 
its theoretical limitations and the recent catastrophe, quantitative analy-
sis continues to have substantial predictive value, and it will continue to 
serve as a central tool for financial industry actors. Securitization has 
brought too many benefits, and too much profit in good times, for modern 
financial markets to eschew it in the future. Indeed, financial innovation 
continues.132 A regulator that does not have the capacity to challenge 
firms’ models will not have the capacity to engage in an important ongo-
ing conversation.  
4. Lesson Four: Regulators Must Have Healthy Skepticism about 
Industry 
 Finally, in addition to having the numbers, the information, and the 
analytical skills, regulatory staffers must have sufficient confidence in 
their own judgment and a healthy degree of skepticism about industry. 
This difficult problem is discussed further below.133 
B. Complexity and Prophylactic Rules 
 One of the striking lessons of the GFC has been the impact of complex-
ity on the financial markets, and the degree to which existing regulatory 
structures failed to manage those effects. Steven Schwarcz even suggests, 
plausibly, that complexity is the “greatest financial market challenge of 
the future.”134 He first describes the complexity in the assets that underlie 
      
business strategies and system-wide risks, more focus on technical competence of FSA 
supervisors, more focus on the details of bank accounting, and greater willingness to 
reach judgments about the overall risks that firms are running. 
130  Jennifer Hughes, “FSA admits errors over Northern Rock” Financial Times [U.K.] (27 
March 2008) 7. 
131  See Nocera, supra note 87; Salmon, supra note 87.  
132  One post-GFC innovation in securitization is based on “life settlements”. See Jenny 
Anderson, “New Exotic Investments Emerging on Wall Street” The New York Times (6 
September 2009) A1. 
133  See “Building Independence and Diversity into the Regulatory Architecture” below. 
134  Schwarcz, “Regulating Complexity”, supra note 32 at 2-3. 
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modern structured financial products, which is overlayered with complex-
ity in the design of the structured products themselves and exacerbated 
by complexity in modern financial markets. He then examines how these 
multiple complexities can lead to inappropriate lending standards, fail-
ures of disclosure, a lack of transparency and even comprehensibility, 
and—perhaps most difficult to manage—the creation of a complex system 
characterized by intricate causal relationships and a “tight coupling” 
within credit markets, in which events tend to amplify each other and 
move rapidly into crisis mode.135 Prior to the GFC, there was a general 
failure by all concerned to appreciate the myriad interrelated ways in 
which complexity can impair markets and financial regulation. 
 It is unrealistic to think that we can now unwind complexity from our 
financial markets. Instead, we must develop a more comprehensive and 
fine-grained understanding of how complexity manifests and for what 
reasons. Schwarcz’s incisive analysis of the sources of complexity is a first 
step. We should also be evaluating varieties of complexity in terms of 
their costs and benefits, both to real economies and financial markets as a 
whole and to various constituencies.  
 Some of the complexity deriving from innovation in structured product 
design is the result of increasing sophistication and fine-tuning, and has 
considerable beneficial effects for investors. After a certain point, how-
ever, either by design or in effect, the overall benefits flowing from ever-
increasing complexity become outweighed by their overall costs. As sug-
gested in the Turner Review, the GFC has challenged the “underlying as-
sumption of financial regulation in the US, the UK and across the world 
… that financial innovation is by definition beneficial, since market disci-
pline will winnow out any unnecessary or value destructive innova-
tions.”136 In retrospect, some recent forms of financial innovation deliv-
ered few benefits but permitted rent-seeking and contributed to signifi-
cantly increased systemic risk.137 As noted in the Turner Review:  
it seems likely that some and perhaps much of the structuring and 
trading activity involved in the complex version of securitised credit 
[over the last ten to fifteen years], was not required to deliver credit 
intermediation efficiently. Instead, it achieved an economic rent ex-
traction made possible by the opacity of margins, the asymmetry of 
information and knowledge between end users of financial services 
and producers, and the structure of principal/agent relationships be-
tween investors and companies and between companies and individ-
ual employees.138 
                                                  
135  Ibid. at 7-32. 
136  Turner, supra note 5 at 47.  
137  Ibid. at 109. 
138  Ibid. at 47. 
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 One of the common arguments in favour of principles-based regulation 
is that it supports innovation. While this continues to be an important 
value, more thought needs to go into precisely how it supports innovation, 
to what point innovation confers net benefits, and to whom those benefits 
flow. A fundamental risk associated with principles-based regulation is 
that, in the absence of the (at least putatively) immovable markers that 
rules represent, there will be “creep” around the meaning of a term.139 
Without regulatory oversight to ensure that terms are interpreted in a 
reasonable and accountable manner, self-interested actors can be ex-
pected to define terms in their own interest. Where there is already un-
derlying uncertainty—for example, around a new or extraordinarily com-
plex product or line of business—or where there is no metric for evaluat-
ing something (e.g., a compliance program, a product, or a risk) across in-
stitutions, the problem can be exacerbated.140 “[R]isky shift”141 can occur, 
especially when markets are experiencing a bubble or competitive pres-
sures push actors toward greater risk-taking.142 Without countervailing, 
independent-minded regulatory power to push back against self-
interested industry conduct, the “creep” may run downwards—toward 
more risk, less transparency, less systemic stability, and less consumer 
protection. 
 Meaningful regulatory oversight is therefore an important considera-
tion, and complexity makes that oversight harder to achieve. We know 
now that our financial regulatory approaches were not built to handle the 
effects of complexity and constant innovation that characterize modern fi-
nancial markets. Principles-based and collaborative regulation is, of 
course, a response to those very phenomena. But as Jack Coffee and 
Hillary Sale have argued, even an optimal regulatory model will not work 
                                                  
139  The argument is reminiscent of Ronald Dworkin’s defence of a written constitution as 
building strong fences around fundamental rights. See Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of 
Rights for Britain (London, U.K.: Chatto & Windus, 1990). I believe that rules are only 
putatively immovable. More precisely, rules can provide temporary or superficial clar-
ity, but under the surface they are as subject to contestation and change as are princi-
ples. See Dorf, supra note 107 at 446-52. 
140  William S. Laufer, “Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance” 
(1999) 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1343 at 1390-91. 
141  “Risky shift” is part of a broader phenomenon of group polarization, referred to as 
“choice shift” in more recent academic work, though in this case the narrower term 
“risky shift” applies. See e.g. James H. Davis, “Group Decision and Social Interaction: A 
Theory of Social Decision Schemes” (1973) 80 Psychological Review 97 at 107-110. See 
also Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, 
Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades” (1992) 100 Journal of Politi-
cal Economy 992.  
142  See Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, “Bullish Citigroup is ‘still dancing’ to the beat 
of buy-out boom,” Financial Times [U.K.] (10 July 2007) A1 quoting Charles Prince (“as 
long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance”). 
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if it is too complex for regulators to implement.143 In terms of the rules-
versus-principles debate, this means taking into account both theory and 
implementation when deciding how to structure particular regulatory 
provisions. Ease of implementation by regulators may be an important 
consideration. This consideration may weigh especially heavily where we 
can identify that additional complexity resulting from structured product 
design innovation is of diminishing marginal utility. There may be con-
texts in which (subject to the caveats below) rules’ greater ability to con-
tain complexity helps justify a rules-based formulation over a principles-
based one, notwithstanding the significant costs to flexibility, innovation, 
congruence, and prospectivity.  
 Capital requirements are a concrete example of where firms with 
more rigid requirements weathered the acute phase of the fall 2008 credit 
crisis better.144 As has been well documented, Canadian capital require-
ments for financial institutions are comparatively high, and even tend to 
be exceeded by the actual practice of Canadian banks. Asset-to-capital ra-
tios are capped at a comparatively low level.145 Canadian financial institu-
tions’ overall success in weathering the GFC has been often attributed to 
these regulatory restrictions.146 Another example, beyond the rules-
versus-principles conversation, is contract term standardization. Espe-
cially with respect to derivative contracts, standardization can help rein 
in complexity, make innovation subject to a degree of price discovery and 
oversight, and make derivatives easier to regulate.147 
                                                  
143  Coffee & Sale, supra note 8 at 55 (indicating that optimal rules may be beyond the ef-
fective capacity of many bureaucracies to implement). 
144  Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, “Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the 
Credit Crisis? A Cross Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation” 
(July 2009) European Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper Series in Finance 
254/2009, online: Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssrn.com> (finding 
that banks in countries with stricter capital requirement regulations and more inde-
pendent supervisors performed better in the July 2007 – December 2008 period). 
145  See e.g. Kevin G. Lynch, “Public Policy Making in a Crisis: A Canadian Perspective” 
(Speech delivered to the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany, 7 May  2009), 
online: Privy Council Office <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca>. 
146  But see Lev Ratnovski & Rocco Huang, “Why Are Canadian Banks More Resilient?” 
IMF Working Paper WP/09/152 Western Hemisphere Department (July 2009) at 4,  
online: International Monetary Fund <https://www.imf.org> (identifying the “key de-
terminant” of Canadian banks’ success as having a larger base of insured retail deposi-
tors). Other factors contributing to the success of Canadian banks include steadier 
housing prices, a more unified regulatory structure, and the fact that mortgage lenders 
in Canada tend to hold the mortgages they extend. See Lynch, supra note 141; Rat-
novski, supra note 147 at 16-18; Fareed Zakaria, “Worthwhile Canadian Initiative; Ca-
nadian banks are typically leveraged at 18 to 1 – compared with U.S. banks at 26 to 1” 
Newsweek Magazine 153: 7 (16 February 2009) 31. 
147  Most OTC derivative contracts are documented under standard forms, known as Mas-
ters, created by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) (See 
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 To use Colin Diver’s terms, capital requirements may be an area in 
which, taking into account all the factors (e.g., poor regulatory oversight, 
gaps in regulation, etc.), transparency and accessibility prove to be more 
important than perfect congruence. In other words, if there is no clear and 
forceful regulatory voice in the interpretive community around a regula-
tory principle, then the (ultimately superficial) certainty provided by (in-
evitably imperfect) rules will still prove more valuable than the flexibility 
and contextuality provided by principles. This is especially the case when 
one considers to whom benefits have flowed. The benefits of flexibility will 
flow to those in a position to apply the principles. When there is no close 
conversation with regulators about, for example, what constitutes mean-
ingful disclosure with respect to complex structured products in the retail 
market, then firms developing those products will decide on the meaning 
of disclosure principles in light of their own interests.  
 We should also consider the role that particular regulatory require-
ments play in overall systemic stability and efficiency. Rules around capi-
tal requirements, like much of prudential regulation, are so fundamental 
to effective functioning of the system that they should not necessarily be 
subject to contestation, innovation, and potential “creep” through collabo-
rative regulatory practice. The analogy in democratic theory would be to 
participation rights, seen by some to be so fundamental to deliberation 
that they should not themselves be subject to the risk of erosion in the 
process of that deliberative exercise.148  
      
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc, online: ISDA <www.isda.org>). 
The United States Department of the Treasury recently presented a bill to Congress 
that would significantly augment private standardization initiatives. The Treasury’s 
bill would allow bank regulators to establish margin and capital requirements for 
banks entering into derivatives contracts, require standardized OTC derivatives con-
tracts to be cleared by a derivatives-clearing organization regulated by the CFTC or the 
SEC, and require banks to have their standardized contracts centrally cleared and 
traded over regulated exchanges. Dealers would no longer be able to directly trade 
standardized derivatives contracts among themselves. They would be required to use 
an exchange or equivalent trading platform. See Department of the Treasury, Press Re-
lease, TG-261, “Administration’s Regulatory Reform Agenda Reaches New Milestone: 
Final Piece of Legislative Language Delivered to Capitol Hill” (11 August 2009), online: 
Department of the Treasury <http://www.ustreas.gov>. 
148  See e.g., Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, “Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial 
Role in New Governance” (2007) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 565 at 576-78; Lisa T. Alexander, 
“Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons From Chicago’s Public Hous-
ing Reform Experiment” (2009) 16 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 117 at 127-28, 180-84.  
There is an analogous debate in new governance scholarship about the degree of “hard-
law” background measures needed (or assumed to exist) to safeguard participatory 
rights or address power disparities. On one end of the spectrum are those who believe 
that substantial participation and hard-law protections oriented towards equality are 
preconditions to the proper functioning of any deliberative model. On the other end are 
those concerned that hard-law principles are fundamentally inconsistent with the de-
liberative project, potentially meaningless, and not necessarily in the long-term inter-
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 We should be careful not to overstate the lesson here. The fact that 
systems with rigid, mandatory capital requirements performed better 
during the financial crisis does not mean that such capital requirements 
will necessarily be better than any more flexible alternative, or that we 
can generalize from capital requirements to other areas of financial regu-
lation. We did not learn that rigid capital requirements are better than 
any mechanism we could possibly imagine. They may not even be better 
than the CSE Program might have been, had it been buttressed by ade-
quate regulatory capacity. Rigid requirements impose costs, too. What we 
learned is that rigid capital requirements worked better than the flawed 
and basically unaccountable capital adequacy system that was in place 
under, for example, the SEC’s CSE Program.  
 It is helpful to see our current struggles with complexity as epistemo-
logical ones.149 Complexity is worrisome right now in part because, as was 
the case in the frozen credit markets in the autumn of 2008, we do not 
know what we do not know. In time, based on greater understanding, we 
may be able to develop a more sophisticated approach to complexity, with 
more and different safeguards in place, which does not seem to force us to 
choose so starkly between flexibility and systemic stability. In other 
words, existing bright-line capital requirements should be seen as pro-
phlylactic, not permanent, rules. Prophylactic rules are clear and gener-
ally overdrawn requirements, like the Miranda rights-reading require-
ment for police in the United States, which serve as placeholders to pro-
tect an important interest until and unless a better, more tailored method 
for achieving the same end can be implemented.150 A “better” approach to 
capital requirements would have to improve flexibility and congruence, 
but not at the expense of the transparency, accountability, and ease of ap-
      
ests of groups seeking equality. See Douglas NeJaime, “When New Governance Fails” 
(2009) 70 Ohio St. L.J. 323.  Even assuming that capital requirements and other pru-
dential measures are of such a fundamental nature in relation to the operation of finan-
cial markets, a range of reasonable opinions could exist as to their optimal degree of 
flexibility in real-life applications. See e.g. Cohen, supra note 111 at 543, n. 47. 
149  Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, “The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis: Complexity, Causation, 
Law, and Judgment” (2009) 21 Suffolk University Law School Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series 09-30, online: Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssrn.com>. 
150  The term derives from American constitutional law theory and is controversial in that 
context. Miranda v. Arizona   held that certain warnings must be given before a sus-
pect’s statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in evidence 
(384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)). The decision invited legislative action to protect 
the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination, but it stated that any legisla-
tive alternative must be “at least as effective in appraising accused persons of their 
right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it” (ibid. at 467). 
The Miranda warning requirement was upheld in Dickerson v. United States, but its 
prophylactic nature was severely narrowed and the warning requirement was constitu-
tionalized (530 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) [Dickerson]). For a new governance per-
spective on prophylactic rules, see Dorf, supra note 107 at 452-59. 
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plication that rigid requirements provide in this crucial aspect of financial 
markets regulation.151 
 Prophylactic rules are helpful in keeping essential systems function-
ing and in conserving regulatory resources. However, under conditions of 
underlying factual uncertainty, rigid rules cannot resolve that uncer-
tainty. Rigid rules will paper over uncertainty, forcing difficult interpreta-
tions underground—or alternatively forcing rule revisions through legis-
lative processes that are far too cumbersome to be serviceable in “live”, 
fast-moving systems. Principles-based regulation is a more promising long 
term response to extreme complexity and consequent uncertainty, be-
cause it allows us to examine and discuss its effects explicitly, directly, 
and openly. New governance generally is about designing the problem-
solving architecture required for handling situations of extreme uncer-
tainty, in which neither the precise ultimate goal nor the means for 
achieving it can be determined in advance.152 This is the kind of environ-
ment in which it makes sense to enlist the context-specific knowledge of a 
broad band of stakeholders in a collective, comparative, learning-by-doing 
regulatory project, while not being naïve about the impact of self-interest 
and power. 
 To summarize this paper’s recommendations thus far: in order to be 
credible, principles-based regulation requires considerable regulatory ca-
pacity. It requires greater regulatory capacity in terms of numbers, re-
sources, and expertise than has been allocated to it in some of the infa-
mous examples of regulatory failure in the past two years—the failure of 
Northern Rock in the United Kingdom, and of the the SEC’s CSE Pro-
gram. At the same time, one should be realistic about regulatory capacity 
when designing a regulatory regime. One should not design a system that 
is too complex for actual regulators to implement. Bright-line prophylactic 
rules, along with contract term standardization and other similar tech-
niques, can help to conserve regulatory resources. Such rules around, for 
example, capital requirements will be useful in the near future as we con-
tinue to grapple with the implications of complexity in the financial mar-
kets. Over the long term, however, a credible, principles-based, collabora-
tive structure will be more robust and effective. 
                                                  
151  In Dickerson (supra note 151) arguments concerning costs and workability for law en-
forcement personnel were sucessfully made in support of upholding the Miranda (supra 
note 151) warning requirements, notwithstanding the “undeniabl[e] instances in which 
the exclusionary rule of Miranda imposes costs on the truth-seeking function of a trial, 
by depriving the trier of fact of ‘what concededly is relevant evidence’” (Dickerson, supra 
note 151 at [...]) 
152  See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds” (2004) 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1016 at 1019-20; Dorf, supra note 107. 
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C. Building Independence and Diversity into the Regulatory Architecture  
 A principles-based approach also has repercussions for the deep struc-
ture of regulation. For many, the GFC represents a fundamental chal-
lenge to the efficient market hypothesis, and indeed to the very place of 
economic theory in developing public policy.153 This paper suggests that 
we consider, instead, recent learning about macro-level regulatory design. 
The task now (the completion of which is beyond the scope of this paper) 
is to identify the structural and dialogical components that are essential 
to ensuring that the principles-based regulatory architecture is robust 
and credible. Chief among those components are mechanisms to ensure 
parties’ accountability and to validate information. 
 Principles-based regulation replaces many tightly defined, statutorily 
entrenched, and hard-to-revise legislative requirements with an ongoing, 
information-based, pragmatic dialogue about good practices and regula-
tory goals.154 The shift itself is not determinative of choices between, for 
example, industry self-regulation or intensive supervision.155 Neverthe-
less, it has practical implications for those policy choices. Under princi-
ples-based regulation, many of the bulwarks of detailed statutory law are 
replaced by more easily revisable requirements. Recall the Table of Con-
cordance between British Columbia’s existing and proposed Securities 
Acts, which serves as a clear illustration of the volume of detailed decision 
making that is moved out of the statute and into rule making under a 
principes-based approach.156 At its best, principles-based regulation there-
fore makes possible a more sophisticated, informed, collaborative, flexible, 
and transparent development of regulatory goals and means. At the same 
time, such a deliberative, iterative process increases the number of “mov-
ing parts”, and makes the act of law-making more porous to external so-
cial forces and trends. What must replace detailed statutory precommit-
ments is serious attention to the capacities, predispositions, and situation 
of front-line decision makers, and to how the various participants in the 
interpretive community can be expected to function together.  
 One way to think about the GFC is as a product of the marginalization 
of overarching regulatory design considerations in favour of overbroad 
faith in market discipline. There were obvious gaps in shadow banking 
industry regulation. Great weight was placed on the shoulders of credit 
                                                  
153  See Turner, supra note 5 at 39 (challenging the efficient market hypothesis); Edmund 
L. Andrews, “Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation” The New York Times (24 Octo-
ber 2008) B1 (testimony of Alan Greenspan, observing a “mistake” in assuming rational 
actors); “Efficiency and Beyond”, supra note 86. 
154  This is the case whether the replacement happens through explicit statutory drafting or 
through choices at the level of implementation. See discussion supra note 55. 
155  See discussion in “Enforced Self-Regulation and Principles-Based Regulation” above.  
156  Supra note 58. 
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rating agencies, without adequate thought to ensuring that those agencies 
were impartial and accountable.157 Regulators were not an effective coun-
terweight against the banks in the Northern Rock158 and CSE Program 
examples.159 In retrospect, programs like the CSE are paradoxes: on one 
hand, regulators delegated risk assessment to firms explicitly because 
they did not and could not possess the knowledge those firms had about 
their own operational risks. Yet, the compensatory steps that might have 
reduced the knowledge gap and ensured more meaningful oversight—
compliance audits, close supervision by adequate numbers of well-trained 
staff—were not taken. Whether because the regimes’ regulator-level ar-
chitects accepted too unthinkingly the laissez-faire ethos of recent 
years,160 or because they had no choice given their lack of regulatory man-
date from legislators161 (and these two are connected), regulatory pro-
grams like the SEC’s CSE Program lacked a commitment to a robust pub-
lic role in either design or implementation.  
 Both the conflict of interest story and the overreliance on market dis-
cipline point to a troubling question that applies not only to the Northern 
Rock failure or the CSE Program, but also to much of the bond and securi-
ties markets. The question is: from which quarter, exactly, was the inde-
pendent critical thinking supposed to come? Jack Coffee’s memorable in-
sight that the “gatekeepers” were one of the weak links that led to the En-
ron debacle resonates again today,162 but it needs to be generalized. These 
are industries that are tightly enmeshed with their regulators and repu-
tational intermediaries. Credit rating agencies were remunerated hand-
somely for giving good ratings to mortgage-backed securities. British 
regulatory and financial services communities are characterized by con-
                                                  
157  See Lowenstein, supra note 72; Partnoy, supra note 72. 
158  See FSA, Northern Rock, supra note 121; see also discussion, supra note 125. The inter-
nal audit into the conduct of the FSA, during its supervision of Northern Rock, identi-
fied a number of situations in which FSA staff failed to appropriately challenge and 
scrutinize information provided by Northern Rock. For example, the audit identified a 
number of instances in which supervisors failed to conduct a “comprehensive analysis of 
the risks inherent in the [Northern Rock] business model” (FSA, Northern Rock, supra 
121 at 30). See also  Turner, supra note 5 (discussing “intensive supervision” at 88-89). 
159  See SEC Oversight, supra note 123; see also discussion supra note 126. 
160  See Turner, supra note 5 (criticizing the FSA for adopting a “laissez-faire” mentality); 
Stephen Labaton notes that “[t]he commission’s decision effectively to outsource its 
oversight to the firms themselves fit squarely in the broader Washington culture of the 
last eight years under President Bush” (supra note 85). 
161  SEC Oversight, supra note 123 at 81-82 (Chairman Cox’s Comments justifying the CSE 
Program on the basis that it was voluntary and the SEC did not otherwise have a man-
date to regulate the CSE). 
162  John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
                                PRINCIPLES-BASED SECURITIES REGULATION  45 
 
 
siderable social overlap.163 Much has been written about the positions of 
public power in the United States occupied by individuals formerly work-
ing in the private sector, and the potential adverse effects on public pol-
icy.164 
 In a provocative article in The Atlantic magazine, Simon Johnson has 
argued that one of the causes of the financial crisis in the United States 
was that the financial industry was dominated by oligarchs with ties to 
government.165 Drawing on his experience working with developing na-
tions at the International Monetary Fund, Johnson predicted that the 
power of the oligarchs would also impede economic recovery because the 
necessary bold steps to regulate industry would not be taken. The author 
concludes that a destabilizing total collapse could be the “cleanse we need” 
and that piecemeal steps taken to avoid confrontation with the oligarchs 
would only prolong the pain. Without accepting that a “cleanse” is the 
necessary course, Johnson’s experience underscores how damaging the 
lack of an external, skeptical perspective can be when operating on an in-
dustry-wide (or even economies-wide) scale. 
 This paper does not argue that individuals with industry experience 
should be barred from assuming positions of responsibility overseeing 
those industries. The benefits of employing regulators with industry ex-
perience, in terms of expertise, perceived legitimacy with industry, and 
persuasive force, are irreplaceable. Nor does this paper focus on the possi-
bility that industry-regulator ties will consistently compromise prosecu-
tions and enforcement actions.166 Beyond these important arguments 
                                                  
163  John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., “Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and 
Why? – The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation” (2007) 95 Geo. 
L.J. 1727 at 1730, 1767-77; Donald C. Langevoort, “The SEC, Retail Investors, and the 
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets” (2009) 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025 (arguing, con-
trary to this paper, that “light touch” regulation is more likely to be successful in small 
and socially interconnected sectors). 
164  Alumni of the investment bank Goldman Sachs have occupied key government posi-
tions not only in the United States, but also at the Bank of Canada (Governor Mark 
Carney), and the World Bank (President Robert Zoellick). See Jenny Anderson & 
Landon Thomas, Jr., “Goldman Sachs Rakes In Profit in Credit Crisis” The New York 
Times (19 November 2007) A1. The Obama administration has not been immune from 
allegations that it was not aggressive enough in its reform of the financial industry as a 
result of overly close ties to that industry. See e.g. Heidi Przybyla, “Obama Embrace of 
Wall Street Insiders Points to Politic Reforms” (19 November 2008), online: Bloomberg 
<http://www.bloomberg.com>; Joe Hagan, “Tenacious G” New York Magazine (26 July 
2009), online: New York Magazine <http://nymag.com>. 
165  Simon Johnson, “The Quiet Coup” The Atlantic (May 2009), online: The Atlantic 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200905/imf-advice>. 
166  But see Stavros Gadinis, “The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from En-
forcement against Broker-Dealers” (August 2009) Harvard Law and Economics Discus-
sion Paper 27, online: Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssrn.com> (find-
ing that the SEC favours defendants associated with big firms compared to defendants 
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about agency capture is a subtler worry about perspective. As Joseph E. 
Stiglitz has observed, “[i]f those who are supposed to regulate the finan-
cial markets approach the problem from financial markets’ perspectives, 
they will not provide an adequate check and balance.”167 Neither gate-
keepers nor regulators will serve their function effectively if they are not 
firmly rooted in an independent source of authority and meaning, which is 
in active tension with their allegiances “within the circle” of those they 
oversee. Such anchors help them resist the pull of groupthink, cascades, 
and collective confusion that can take hold within a particular commu-
nity—phenomena that are especially dangerous in principles-based regu-
lation because of the degree of built-in fluidity. 
 An absence of diversity in perspective may also have implications for 
an industry’s ability to self-regulate. Leaving aside regulatory failure, one 
may ask why investment banks themselves did such a poor job of quanti-
fying and managing the risks they were running. In multiple and intri-
cately connected ways, firm culture can affect the degree to which a firm 
is capable of acting independently in the face of competitive pressures and 
behavioral cascades. Goldman Sachs famously managed to avoid some of 
the worst excesses in mortgage-backed securities, arguably as a result of 
its culture of “contrary thinking” relative to the rest of its industry.168 In-
ternal diversity may also influence a firm’s stance toward risk-taking, as 
Michael Lewis’s analysis of Icelandic banks and culture,169 as well as stud-
ies of the influence of gender in the financial services industry,170 suggest. 
      
associated with smaller firms, and hypothesizing that either resource constraints or a 
desire to favor prospective employers may explain this systematic bias); Maria M. Cor-
reia, “Political Connections, SEC Enforcement and Accounting Quality” (2009) Rock 
Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper Series 61, online: Social Science Re-
search Network <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1458478> (finding 
that firms with low accounting quality have greater political expenses on average, and 
that politically connected firms may face less SEC enforcement action and lower sanc-
tions).  Note the findings of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in the Madoff case: 
the OIG found no evidence of improper influence or inappropriate relationships with 
Madoff, but noted that  SEC staffers’ awareness of Madoff’s stature played an ancillary 
role in their work. Investigation of Failure, supra note 126 at 373-89.   
167  Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Principles for a New Financial Architecture” The Commission of 
Experts of the President of the UN General Assembly on Reforms of the International 
Monetary and Financial System, online: United Nations <http://www.un.org>. 
168  See Anderson, supra note 164; Przybyla, supra note 164. The latter article suggests that 
Goldman Sachs’ behavior has been contrary in relation to its competitors, but that its 
internal culture is actually conformist and homogeneous. 
169   “Wall Street on the Tundra” Vanity Fair (April 2009), online: Vanity Fair 
<http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/04/iceland200904>. 
170  Linda McDowell, Capital Culture: Gender at Work in the City (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); 
Paola Sapienza, Luigi Zingales & Dario Maestripieri, “Gender Differences in Financial 
Risk Aversion and Career Choices are Affected by Testosterone” (2009) 106 Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Science 15268.  
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Enforced self-regulation also stands the best chance of success when in-
dustry actors genuinely care about their broader reputations, something 
that requires commitments and allegiances beyond one’s own firm and in-
dustry.171 All of this should lead us to wonder whether institutions that 
draw on a broader range of perspectives may be better able to maintain 
some cognitive distance from group pathologies, to their own advantage, 
and to the advantage of an enforced self-regulatory approach. 
 This suggests a few specific reform recommendations. To begin with, 
careful thought needs to be given as to how the various pieces of a princi-
ples-based regulatory approach will function together; where each actor’s 
strengths and vulnerabilities lie, who is or is not participating in the in-
terpretive community, and what is required to build checks and balances 
into the system’s functioning.172 Credit rating agencies are an obvious ex-
ample.  If they are to continue to fulfill a central role as reputational in-
termediaries, they obviously need to be more independent and better 
regulated than they recently have been. Regulators should also consider 
making hiring decisions based not only on applicants’ relevant industry 
and legal expertise, but also with a view to whether applicants seem to 
have sufficient confidence and independence of mind (however obtained) 
to keep them mindful of their distinct public role in the face of well-
resourced and coordinated action from industry. Regulators in a princi-
ples-based or enforced self-regulatory regime should also watch for group-
think and behavioral cascades within their industry, and they may want 
to give additional recognition or leeway to the views of industry outliers 
when a cascade appears to be developing.173 This may ultimately call for a 
richer description of the relationships between capital markets actors and 
the other crucial social, institutional, and historical milieus in which they 
are embedded—to understand which actors might “keep their heads” and 
how to ensure their participation to that end. 
 Finally, a diversity of perspectives is important to principles-based 
regulation at the macro level. Principles-based regulation will not func-
tion well if it is purely technocratic, closed, and expertise based. Technical 
                                                  
171  Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 103 at 131. Balleisen and Eisner describe the other pre-
requisites to effective co-regulation as: “the relevance of flexibility in regulatory detail”, 
“the existence of sufficient bureaucratic capacity and autonomy on the part of nongov-
ernmental regulators”, “the degree of transparency in the regulatory process”, and “the 
seriousness of accountability.” 
172  For an example that assesses American institutions along these lines, see Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, “Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government De-
sign” (Symposium: Getting beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory State) 
(2002) 87 Cornell L. Rev. 549. 
173  Regulators in a principles-based system can influence industry behavior in a variety of 
ways, such as public recognition of good practices or reduced regulatory oversight for 
firm-developed approaches that carry indicia of reliability.  
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expertise is not necessarily politically or socially neutral, and expertise-
based models can shut down useful discussion. By contrast, principles-
based regulation is a system whose evolution depends not on modelling, 
but on ongoing dialogue with stakeholders based on their real-life experi-
ence. Principles-based regulation is actually a different model from that 
based on technical expertise: it derives its legitimacy from its collabora-
tive, dialogic experience, and it operates on the basis that pragmatic, 
learning-by-doing experience is a more reliable foundation than abstract 
theory for regulatory policy development.174 The quality of the decisions 
that emerge from its collaborative process, as well as the basic legitimacy 
of that process, require broad participation. It also matters whether the 
interpretive community that is engaged in filling in the details around a 
principles-level regulatory requirement is sufficiently inclusive and di-
verse. That community must have enough common ground that its con-
stituent parts can speak to each other and a certain degree of trust can 
exist. At the same time, too much homogeneity limits the range of possi-
bilities capable of being imagined.175 This calls for a regulatory architec-
ture that specifically builds in opportunities for all key stakeholders to 
participate.  
 For Julia Black, principles-based regulation at its fullest is a polycen-
tric process that pulls in a wide variety of stakeholders.176 For the Expert 
Panel as well, principles-based regulation needs to be supported by 
greater investor participation guarantees, in the form of an independent 
investor panel and dedicated investor issues groups.177 Broader stake-
holder participation does not guarantee good regulatory outcomes, of 
course. The FSA’s Consumer and Practitioner Panels did not prevent the 
Northern Rock debacle.178 Stakeholder participation also introduces its 
                                                  
174   Amar Bhidé makes a persuasive case for common sense, experience-based decision 
making over “make-believe models” (Amar Bhidé, “An Accident Waiting to Happen” 
(2009) 21 Critical Review 211). 
175  See e.g. Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1998). 
176  Black, “Forms and Paradoxes”, supra note 46 at 23-24. In this article, Black particu-
larly mentions trade associations and industry representatives, nominated advisers 
(NOMADs) on the London Stock Exchange’s junior market, the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM), and consultants and advisors, including lawyers. 
177  Capital Markets, supra note 2 at 36-37. Elsewhere Black has also emphasized the im-
portance of consumer voice (see Julia Black, “Involving Consumers in Securities Regu-
lation” in Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada: Canada Steps Up, 
vol. 6 (23 June 2006), online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada 
<http://www.tfmsl.ca >). 
178  The FSMA requires the FSA to consult practitioners (i.e., registrants) and consumers, 
to establish a Practitioner Panel and a Consumer Panel, and to consider their represen-
tations. See FSMA, supra note 43, ss. 8-11. 
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own significant challenges.179 At the same time, one may ask what might 
have happened, had the secret “war games” that revealed the risks that 
Northern Rock posed to systemic stability been made public back in 
2004.180 
Conclusion 
 The GFC contains cautionary lessons about the risks associated with 
principles-based regulation when it is not reinforced by a meaningful 
regulatory presence. However, the response cannot be a knee-jerk rever-
sion to either a more rules-based or a more command-and-control ap-
proach. Principles-based regulation accompanied by input from industry 
was a direct response to a situation where regulators were underin-
formed, always playing catch-up, and made fools of not only by Enron-
style corporations engaging in “loophole behaviour,” but also (to harken 
back to the negative image of 1970s bureaucracies) by their own rigid, 
seized-up processes. The costs of a system that is too rule-based are also 
considerable: it can stifle innovation, create loopholes and loophole-
oriented behaviour, drive uncertainty “underground” and make problem-
solving less explicit, and impose costs related to inflexibility. Principles-
based regulation needs to be understood as a response to those very real 
problems. 
 Nor should we imagine that a return to older regulatory strategies 
would avoid future frauds. There is no hope of returning the genies of fi-
nancial innovation and complexity to the bottle. Under conditions of such 
extreme uncertainty, ongoing interpretation of underlying principles is 
the only feasible option. Facially straightforward rules cannot make a 
complex situation simple. Detailed rules will be out of date by the time 
they are drafted. Principles are attractive because they can adapt to 
emerging events, and can adapt in a transparent and accountable way. By 
contrast, rules must evolve either through time-consuming statutory 
                                                  
179  Poorly managed, participatory processes can degenerate into interest-group politics and 
unprincipled horse-trading, as well as reproducing existing power imbalances. Exper-
tise and information can serve as an important counterweight to these urges. While 
success is not easy to achieve, an ever-growing body of scholarship and practice around 
deliberative decision making has helped to identify critical success factors and best 
practices. An internationally significant experiment in deliberative democracy took 
place in British Columbia in 2004, around electoral system redesign. See Mark E. War-
ren & Hilary Pearse, eds., Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia 
Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
180  “Northern Rock Risk”, supra note 125. According to this article, FSA regulators con-
cluded at the time that they could not force Northern Rock and HBOS to change their 
practices. Actively pulling in other stakeholders may also enhance existing regulatory 
capacity. 
50    (2010) 55  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
amendment, or through selective or non-enforcement that conceals the 
exercise of substantial regulatory discretion.  
 However, thought needs to be given as to how principles-based regula-
tion perpetuates or even amplifies existing structural flaws in regulation. 
To be effective, principles-based regulation must call for increasing regu-
latory resources, develop a thoughtful response to complexity (including a 
place for prophylactic rules), and consciously incorporate a broader and 
more independent range of perspectives into the regulatory discussion. As 
Canada’s Expert Panel well appreciated, careful implementation and 
meaningful enforcement are everything in building a strong principles-
based regulatory approach.181  
    
                                                  
181  Capital Markets, supra note 2 at 19-22. 
